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I.
INTRODUCTION

On January 9, 2007, the Supreme Court stunned the licensing community by holding that a licensee who is enjoying
all of the legal protections of the license can nonetheless de* Visiting Professor and BCLT Kauffman Fellow in Law & Entrepreneurship, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Associate Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Entrepreneurial Law Clinic,
University of Washington School of Law. The author thanks Bob
Gomulkiewicz for his invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this paper
and Sarah Harris, Cristina Alger, and the editors at the NYUJournal of Law &
Business.
381

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business

NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND BUSINESS

[Vol. 3:381

stroy the underlying patent by obtaining a declaratory judgment that it is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. On
the face of it, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,1 is a narrow
technical interpretation of the U.S. Constitution's Article III
limitation of federal court jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies," in the context of the "actual controversy" requirement
of the Declaratory Judgment Act.2 In practical effect, the case
represents the unsettling shift in the settled expectations
about patent challenges in the licensor-licensee relationship.
That the apple cart has indeed been upset, so to speak, is evident in the abundant immediate offerings of professional organizations - such as the Licensing Executives Society,3 and
American Bar Association 4 - and law firms 5 to help practitioners and lay persons understand the implications of the MedImmune decision and quickly retool licensing strategies accordingly.
As discussed in more detail below, the common understanding before MedImmune was that licensees had to repudiate the license by ceasing royalty payments, for example,
before having standing to bring a declaratory judgment action
to find the licensed patent invalid, unenforceable, or non-infringed. This repudiation allowed the licensor/patent owner
to bring its own patent infringement suit directly as plaintiff,
or as a counterclaim as the defendant in a declaratory judgment brought by the licensee. The MedImmune decision seems
to allow the licensee to snipe at the patent with impunity because so long as the licensee complies with its license obligations the licensor/patent owner can neither bring a direct patent infringement suit, nor counterclaim patent infringement.
At the same time, the patent owner cannot effectively protect
1. 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007).
2. 28 U.S.C. §2201(a) (2000).
3. See Press Release, Licensing Executives Society, Supreme Court Decision Will Alter Structure of Future Deals, Licensing Executives Society Says
(Jan. 10, 2007), availableat http://www.usa-canada.les.org/press/archives/1.
10.07.asp.
4. See American Bar Association CLE, Potential Licensing Responses to
MedImmune, http://www.abanet.org/cle/programs/t07medl.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
5. See, e.g., Douglas D. Chung & MatthewJ. Kleiman, WilmerHale, US
Supreme Court Holds Courts May Hear Challenges by Patent Licensees,
Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?
publication=3566.
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itself by contractually prohibiting the licensee from challenging the patent because such provisions are generally unenforceable under the doctrine established in cases such as Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins. 6 Thus, patent owners now find themselves subject to the untenable possibility that they will be like landlords
who would have to sit back and wait while a tenant tried to
burn down the house for insurance money because the landlord was legally prohibited from evicting the tenant. This
would be shocking as a matter of landlord-tenant law and it
should be equally shocking in licensing law.
Nonetheless, keeping in mind former Justice Jackson's famous remark about the Supreme Court ("[w] e are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we
are final"), 7 whatever one thinks about the MedImmune decision, it now defines the playing field for licensing relationships. Perhaps some special interest groups aligned with patent owners will successfully lobby Congress for a legislative fix
to their predicament - although it is not clear what that would
look like. This Article, however, proposes a more or less functional equivalent mechanism to a patent royalty stream
through the use of stock and stock options in the licensee.
The stock would coarsely track the overall fortunes of the licensee, while the options could be more finely tuned to vest
and become exercisable upon events and milestones that
would have been used for payments in a traditional license fee
plus royalty stream licensing deal. There may be problems of
liquidity, of course, during the period where the licensee is
still privately held and thus has no ready markets for its stock.
But even this could be dealt with to some extent by redemption rights or put options on the stock held by the licensor.
The real value of what may seem to be a complicated replacement for the relatively straightforward royalty stream licensing
arrangement is that the stock compensation system would consist of value and rights fully conveyed to the licensor upon the
execution of the license agreement. Thus, any subsequent
challenge to the patents and adverse finding against the licensor would not jeopardize the licensor's expected returns
where the licensee successfully commercializes the underlying
patent.
6. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
7. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Part II of the Article provides a taxonomy of license arrangements and then analyzes the complicated history ofjudicial debate over licenses and doctrines such as licensee estoppel and assignor estoppel. Part III discusses MedImmune and
its implications, showing the need for a solution to minimize
the new risks to royalty payments presented by MedImmune. Finally, the proposed solution to use stock and stock options to
allow licensees to convey over to Licensor all of the equity positions required so that Licensor can exercise these in a manner
that tracks the fortunes of the company is discussed in detail in
Part IV.
II.
TAXONOMY OF LICENSES AND THE HISTORY OF PATENT
CHALLENGES TO LICENSES BEFORE MEDIMMUNE

Intellectual property (IP), technology, and information licensing has emerged over the past few decades as the predominant manner of conveying rights and arranging business relationships in the new technological age.8 In this context, a "license" can be viewed as either a grant of permission or a
covenant not to sue. 9 It is different from a "lease" which instead conveys temporary possession and use rights to physical
property to the lessee.1 0 In both the information technology
(IT) and life sciences fields, owners of proprietary technology
often use a legal model I have described elsewhere as the
"lease-license model" whereby a single agreement conveys
both physical property rights and IP license rights." This Article focuses primarily on the IP license side of these arrangements, although it is important to realize that the leverage of
physical property rights and leases can mitigate to some extent
the economic harm to the technology owner where a lesseelicensee successfully challenges an underlying patent in a declaratory judgment in the wake of MedImmune.
8. XUAN-THtAo N. NGUYEN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, SOFTwARE,
AND INFORMATION LICENSING: LAW AND PRACTICE 2-3 (2006).
9. Id. at 3-4.
10. Sean M. O'Connor, The Use of MTAs to Control Commercialization of
Stem Cell Diagnostics and Therapeutics, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1018-27

(2006).
11. Id.
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Another way to think about the current licensing environment is to create a simple taxonomy of types of licenses based
on the motivations of the parties entering into the license.
The central division in my proposed taxonomy is between IP
licenses that originate as settlements to IP infringement disputes ("settlement licenses") and those that originate from
parties who simply have a desire to license IP as a business deal
("deal licenses"). Settlement licenses may arise from an actual
litigation or from policing and enforcement activities of the IP
owner such as correspondence to suspected infringers in the
form of IP ownership notices 12 or cease and desist letters.' 3 As
in many taxonomies, the divisions are often a bit artificial and
can blur at the edges. For example, an IP ownership notice
sent from one company to another might trigger discussions
for a more comprehensive mutually beneficial business deal
(and hence a deal license) rather than a narrow IP use license
that has the air of a begrudging response to a shake down (the
settlement license). Nonetheless, the imperfect distinction I
propose is useful as it sets the stage for a way to think about
the idea of how coercive the IP owner has been in procuring
the license from the licensee, a factor of importance for the
14
Supreme Court in MedImmune.

Within the realm of settlement licenses are those often
drafted by litigators as part of the negotiated settlement to an
actual lawsuit as well as those that may be quite formulaic and
drafted by IP counsel as part of ongoing monitoring and policing of IP rights of the client generally. While much of this
policing is directed at businesses, a significant amount is also
directed at individuals. In some cases, the policing efforts may
12. Generally, notices are in the form of "you should be aware that we
hold the fights to U.S. Patent No. x,xxx,xxx to which you may want to enter
into a license agreement with us."
13. Generally, they are in the form of "your activities are infringing our
rights under U.S. Patent No. xxx,xxx and we demand that you either cease
these activities or enter into negotiations with us to procure a license." Note
that the full on cease and desist letter will, in almost all cases, provide a
sufficient trigger for the recipient of the letter to bring a declaratory judgment action against the sender of the letter (and IP owner) to establish that
the IP is either invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. This renders the
decision of when and whether to use the cease and desist letter versus the IP
notice letter (or neither and simply bring a lawsuit immediately) as an important legal and business strategy decision for the IP owner.
14. See infra Part III(A).
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seem extreme and possibly overreaching,' 5 or even downright
extortionist and fraudulent. 16 Where the settlement license
arises in actual litigation, there should at least be some colorable basis for the IP rights asserted (else the purported IP
owner's counsel may be liable for sanctions). However, where
the settlement license arises simply from policing correspondence between the parties, there may be no real basis for the
IP ownership or infringement claims. Thus, the latter may
raise hackles and equitable concerns about their enforceability, despite the general principle of freedom to contract, as
exploitive shake downs of unwary or easily intimidated smaller
businesses or individuals lacking the means or stomach for
what may be threatened as a protracted legal battle. Lurking
in the background is the specter of so-called "patent trolls"
who do not commercialize the patents they hold through manufacture or active licensing programs, but instead lie in wait
for some hapless company to bring a product to market that
arguably infringes some corner of the troll's patent portfolio
and then - abruptly - emerge with an infringement lawsuit
threatening the an injunction against the defendant company. 17 I suggest that it is this area of potential abuse of settle15. See, e.g., The Lactivist, Overzealous Big Pork Stomps on Breastfeeding
Blogger http://thelactivist.blogspot.com/2007/02/overzealous-big-porkstomps-on.html (Feb. 1, 2007); Letter from Rochelle M. Trafton, Assoc.
Counsel, Spherion Corp. to Paul Steven Miller, Professor, Univ. of Wis. Sch.
of Law (Jan. 11, 2005) (on file with NYU Journal of Law & Business).
16. See, e.g., Posting of Marcel D. Mongeon, marcelm@mcmaster.ca, to
techno-l@lists.uventures.com (Apr. 3, 2003) (on file with NYU Journal of
Law & Business); Posting of Kevin Croft, K-Croft@blo.usyd.edu.au, to
techno-l@lists.uventures.com (Apr. 2, 2003) (on file with NYU Journal of
Law & Business); Posting ofJaconda Wagner, JacondaWagner@bd.com, to
techno-l@lists.uventures.com (Apr. 3, 2003) (on file with author).
17. SeeJoe Brennan et al. Patent Trolls in the U.S., Japan, Taiwan and Europe, CASRIP NEWSL. (Ctr. For Advanced Study & Research on Intellectual
Prop., Seattle, Wash.) Spring/Summer 2006, at 1 available at http://www.
iaw.washington.edu/Casrip/Newsletter/Voll 3/newsvl 3i2BrennanEtA1.
html. Note that the troll's big stick - the threat of an injunction that could
take the defendant's product entirely out of the market - has been blunted
somewhat by last year's Supreme Court decision in EBay vs. MercExchange,
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), that rejected the proposition that injunctive relief
should be automatically granted upon any finding of patent infringement.
Instead, courts are now directed to use standard tests for whether the equities of the situation call for the extraordinary relief of an injunction. Despite
this development, the threat of injunction still hangs over patent infringe-
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ment licenses that plays some role in the Supreme Court's
MedImmune decision as discussed below.
On the other side of the ledger, however, are arms-length,
non-coercive deal licensees. Primary in this category are deal
licenses between sophisticated businesses with experienced IP
counsel (B2B deal licenses). Perhaps somewhat more controversially, I also include business to consumer deal licenses
(B2C deal licenses) such as end user license agreements for
software (EULAs) in this category of arms length non-coercive
deal licenses because consumers are only entering into the
agreement because they want to gain access to some form of

proprietary software or technology to which they otherwise
have no practical technological access.1 8 Contrast this with activities they are doing with what they believe to be their own
materials and technologies that then become the subject of
policing efforts by another party alleging infringement of exclusive IP rights. I acknowledge that this may seem to be an
imperfect or unsatisfactory distinction to some readers in that
some software and other technology products are so pervasive
as to seem "mandatory" to consumers and yet the EULAs or
other retail IP license agreements may appear to be onerous
"take it or leave it" contracts of adhesion.' 9 Nonetheless, I reaffirm that these transactions are still more voluntary and discretionary than when one is approached by an IP owner with
allegations of infringement for something that one is doing
with one's own materials and technologies. 20 Fleshing out the
deal license category a bit more are complicated joint venture
or strategic alliance deals that contain IP licenses (and often
cross licenses) as only one component of an overarching business relationship that may also entail stock swaps, collaborative
research (perhaps generating still more IP), and perhaps even
the creation of a new entity, co-owned by the joint venturers,
ment proceedings and is thus still an effective, if somewhat weaker, club to
be wielded by the patent troll.
18. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User Friendly
Mass Market Licenses for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REv. 687, 688-92 (2004).
19. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the Decision to Trust the
Courts: The Case Against Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms, Especially for
Software, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 753 (2004).
20. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 335 (1996).
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to house the joint venture activities. The upshot is that few of
these deal licenses should raise the same equitable concerns as
those raised particularly by the abusive segment within the category of settlement licenses.
With this rough taxonomy of IP licenses in mind, we can
delve back into what amount to two different threads of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the doctrine of licensee
estoppel that form the critical background environment for
MedImmune. Licensee estoppel is nicely summarized by the
Court in a 1950 decision, Automatic Radio ManufacturingCo. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc.,21 as "[t]he general rule... that the licensee under a patent license agreement may not challenge
the validity of the licensed patent in a suit for royalties due
under the contract." 22 To some extent the two separate licensee estoppel case lineages track the vacillations of the Court
over time between relatively pro-patent and anti-patent
stances. Along the way, the Court grappled with the question
whether limitations on the doctrine had so eroded it that it no
longer existed. 23 However, at times the Court seemed to lose
sight of the fact that a "general rule" is just that: it applies generally, but not always. Instead, the Court, in some instances,
appeared to believe that if there were any limitations on the
doctrine, then it must not be a viable doctrine anymore. Of
course, legal doctrines often do not behave that way. Rather,
arguably, there is a natural trajectory to them in which they are
first articulated, then applied liberally until reaching some
points where they begin to conflict with other doctrines or
principles, and finally a time in which the boundaries of the
appropriate application of the doctrine begin to take shape.
In the following case law analysis, this theme will play out
clearly. In the first section, we will follow the waxing and waning of licensee estoppel until its death in the 1969 case, Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins. 24 If the first section chronicles the continued
narrowing of the doctrine of licensee estoppel, then the second section documents the institution of limitations on Lear's
purported ban on licensee estoppel, essentially reviving the
21. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827

(1950).
22. Id. at 836.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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doctrine to some degree. Later, in Part III we will see how the
Supreme Court waded into this alleged revival of licensee estoppel by the Federal Circuit when it handed down its unexpected opinion in MedImmune.
A.

Licensee Estoppel Before Lear v. Adkins

Patents are hard to value because they have little intrinsic
value. In the absence of a patent covering a good or service,
everyone starts from the same legal position as to whether they
can provide the good or service to the marketplace. If the
good or service is not otherwise prohibited by law, then anyone can attempt to sell it in the marketplace. Thus, the patent
does not give its owner the right to provide the covered good or
service, rather it only gives her the right to exclude others from
doing so. This is why the patent grant is often called a "negative right."25 The value of the patent to its owner, then, is to
give her a competitive edge against others in the marketplace
because she can legally enforce her right to be the only one
providing the covered good or service there.
What is the value of this competitive edge that the patent's exclusive or negative right gives to its owner? Arguably it
is the (hopefully) increased profits that the patent owner is
able to earn from sales of the covered good or service over
acceptable market substitutes. The picture is more complicated, however, because there may be no acceptable market
substitutes, in which case the patent owner may be able to effectively corner the market for what might turn out to be a
new class of goods or services. In this case, the only alternatives to the consumer are to pay whatever price the patent
owner demands or forego this type of good or service altogether. This latter scenario may be what people are thinking
of when they refer to a patent as a government granted monopoly. In the opposite direction, a patent owner may find
herself entering a marketplace with many acceptable market
substitutes for her covered good or service. Further, some or
all of these substitutes may have been patented by others, such
that our patent owner can only provide her patented good or
25. See, e.g.,

DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES

AND MATERIALS 4-5 (3d ed. 2004) (introducing concept

of exclusive right

and reprinting Giles Rich's famous formulation of it in lecture notes from
Columbia Law School).
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service in a competitive marketplace. Faced with the prospects
of gaining only some minority market share, she may view the
value of her patent as primarily a defensive measure to protect
her market share, rather than as an offensive tool to give her
pricing power. It will also work as a defense against the possibility that someone else might patent her good or service and
force her out of the market entirely. In sum, the "value" of the
patent to her can range from the high of a near monopolistic
position to the low of mere survival.
Determining the value of a patent in a licensing situation
requires different perspectives. Settlement licenses may be negotiated against a background record of established sales of
infringing products, such that the licensor and licensee may
have a sense of both the market value for products covered by
the patent and the damage to the patent owner's own sales in
that market. 26 Further, in cases where the infringer uses a
costly production line tailored to produce an infringing good,
the threat of an injunction that would shut this facility down
may give some extra negotiating leverage to the patent owner.
Nonetheless, the valuation of the license going forward can be
complicated. What role does the patented technology really
play in the infringing products, i.e. what percentage of the final product is covered by the patent? How might the market
for the covered goods or services be changing and thus possibly affecting the potential revenue streams for the covered
products? The situation is murkier for deal licenses. When
parties contemplate an exclusive deal license for a yet to be
commercialized product many factors must be considered.
How close to market is the product as developed by the patent
owner and covered by the patent? How much manufacturing
R&D will the licensee have to undertake to actually bring a
26. Of course, this interrelationship of sales of authorized products and
infringing products can be complicated. For example, the existence of the
infringing goods in the marketplace may have added enough supply to lower
demand and hence price control for both the patent owner and the infringer, especially where the infringer was able to price its product substantially lower than the patent owner's version because the infringer avoided
the R&D costs that the patent owner incurred in initially bringing the product to market. This has led to a proliferation of damages measures advanced
by plaintiffs in infringement cases such as lost profits, etc. See generally RoBERT

AGE

P.

MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL

347-49 (4th ed. 2006).
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cost effective mass produced version of the patented product
to market at a price point that prospective buyers will pay?
What is this price point? How big is the total market for the
class of goods and services that the patented product falls into?
How much market share can the patent owner and its licensee
expect the final marketed product to obtain? In essence, the
patent owner/licensor in a commercialization deal license assumes two separate risks: first, the risk of bringing any product
to market; and second, the risk that the licensee will inadequately execute a commercialization plan. At the end of the
day, both settlement and deal licenses must be negotiated
without any real certainty about the dollar value of the patent
license to the licensee during the term of the license.
A standard solution to the expected value problem is the
running royalty license. In this case, the parties negotiate a
royalty rate - often somewhere between 1%-10% of net sales of
the licensee's products embodying the patent - that the licensee will pay quarterly or annually based on actual sales recorded for the immediately preceding quarter or year. 27 This
device ties the licensor's returns on the license to the actual
use of the patent by the licensee and the success of the commercialization effort. Perhaps more importantly, it is in many
cases the only viable mechanism that will allow the licensee to
accept the license in the first place. For all but the largest or
most cash-rich companies, it is not feasible to pay all of the net
present value of the license (even if that could be calculated or
simply stipulated as part of a negotiation) up front. Even a
fixed or flat annual license fee - disconnected from any actual
sales - could be a deal breaker for many licensees in that they
would be obliged to pay the fee regardless of whether they
made or sold any products under the license, or indeed were
even in that line of business anymore. Essentially, flat fee arrangements run the risk of either seriously over- or under-compensating the licensor. 28 Regardless of the possible merits and
27. See NGUYEN ET AL., supranote 8, at 113-17. Net sales are often used in
lieu of gross sales because the licensee should not be paying a percentage of
gross receipts that it takes in that may include payment for taxes assessed on
the licensee or which may be effectively later reduced due to charge backs or
other set offs.
28. The main use of flat fee arrangements seems to be in broad patent
policing actions which may simply offer non-exclusive licenses to all identified potential infringers for a single or annual flat fee. Personally, these
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uses of other license payment structures other than running
royalty arrangements, this Article focuses on the latter because
they constitute a substantial proportion of license agreements
and are most affected by the MedImmune decision.
During the term of a running royalty license, the licensee
may decide that its products or services are no longer covered
by the patent (i.e., something about the product has been
changed), or never should have been considered to have been
covered by the patent. Alternatively, the licensee may decide
that the patent should never have been issued in the first
place, or that the patent owner/licensor is engaging in some
activity such as patent misuse that renders the patent unenforceable until the activity ceases. 29 To clarify some of the nomenclature used in this section: (i) a patent that never should
have been issued is "invalid"; (ii) a patent that is otherwise
valid but whose enforcement may be blocked because of issues
such as misuse is "unenforceable;" and (iii) a defendant's activities that are outside the scope of the claims of an otherwise
valid and enforceable patent are "noninfringing." If any of
these apply after the license agreement has been executed, the
question arises as to whether and how the licensee can terminate its obligations - primarily as to payment - under the li-

cense. However, this might be framed as a simple freedom to
contract issue whereby, absent any unconscionable clauses or
duress in execution, the parties entered into their bargain and
are estopped from challenging the contract when they later
decide that the bargain was a bad one for them.
One obvious tactic for the licensee who believes that the
license agreement should not apply to him anymore is for him
to simply stop paying and repudiate the license. The licensor
can then sue him on the basis of breach of contract and patent
infringement theories (because the covenant not to sue component of the license is arguably no longer in force if the license has been repudiated and thus effectively terminated).
The licensee is, of course, free to raise the affirmative defenses
sorts of coarse grained licenses often strike me as more of a targeted industry-wide shakedown based on non-existent patents, patents of dubious validity, or relevance to the licensees' activities. If the patents are strong and
truly cover the alleged infringer's activities, this arrangement would not
make much sense.
29. See, e.g., NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 32-34.
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that the license contract was invalid because of a failure of consideration. The basis of the bargain - a valid, enforceable, and
infringed patent - turned out to be non-existent. This contract-based argument could be accompanied by an affirmative
patent infringement defense that the underlying patent was invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.
In fact, the foregoing strategy has been used by patent
licensees going back to at least the late 1800s, as will be seen in
the remainder of this section. A critical question raised early
on in the litigation of these license disputes was whether a
state or federal law theory of licensee estoppel would preclude
(former) licensees from raising these kinds of challenges. In a
case from 1905, United States v. Harvey Steel Company,30 the Supreme Court appeared to find that a licensee - in this case the
United States - was estopped from challenging the validity of a
patent it had freely taken a license under before later repudiating the agreement. 3' The Court failed to state whether this
licensee estoppel doctrine was of state or federal law origin.
However, in 1942 the Supreme Court found in Sola Electric
Company v. Jefferson Electric Company32 that a patent validity challenge could be raised by a defendant as part of a counterclaim
alleging federal antitrust law violations under the Sherman Antitrust Act 33 by the licensor/patent owner. 34 Thus, the Court
was not treating the patent validity challenge raised by the licensee as an affirmative defense to either a contract breach or
patent infringement claim, but rather as a separate counterclaim brought by the licensee against the licensor for anticompetitive actions in contravention of federal antitrust laws. The
Sola Court acknowledged the Harvey Court's discussion of licensee estoppel doctrine, but asserted that the doctrine was
not dispositive in the context of an antitrust violation counterclaim that required the Court to consider whether the successful enforcement of federal antitrust law and policy must lead
federal courts to disregard conflicting state or local legal doctrines.3 5 After finding that federal law and policy would indeed trump state or local law in this manner, the Sola Court
30. United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 (1905).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 316-17.
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
Sola, 317 U.S. at 177.
Id. at 174-77.
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held that the licensee could challenge the validity of the patent, but only as part of the licensee's antitrust law counterclaim. 36 However, the Sola Court itself never clearly articulated why it believed that the licensee estoppel doctrine it was
disregarding was a creature of state or local law, rather than
federal law. Further, it left open the question as to whether, if
a licensee estoppel doctrine could be found in federal law or
policy (e.g., within the federal patent law), the law and policy
behind the Sherman Antitrust Act would trump the law and
policy behind that federal estoppel doctrine.
The following year the Supreme Court further bypassed
the question of the validity of the doctrine of licensee estoppel
in Altvater v. Freeman,37 by finding that yet another patent validity challenge in the form of a counterclaim could be pursued.
In this convoluted case, Freeman owned U.S. Patent No.
1,681,033 and granted licenses to Altvater and another party
solely to produce dies covered by the patent, but not machines
covered by the patent.3 8 Altvater nonetheless marketed a machine arguably covered by the patent, in violation of the license agreement, and Freeman successfully sued him for specific performance of the agreement and was awarded an accounting for payment of royalties that would have been owed
if Freeman had licensed Altvater to market the machines
rather than just the dies. 3 9 Of note, the original license agreement apparently had a provision in which Altvater as licensee
waived the right to challenge the validity of the patent during
its life. 40 Regardless of this, the court in that proceeding appeared to have adopted the doctrine of licensee estoppel with41
out reference to this contractual restriction.
Around the same time, however, Freeman brought a separate litigation alleging infringement of his patent by an unlicensed company, Premier Machine Company. 42 The defendant successfully invalidated 23 of the 26 patent claims at issue
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
1936)).

Id. at 176-77.
Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 364 (1943).
Id. at 360 n.1.
Id. at 360-61.
Id. at 360 n.1.
Id. at 361.
Id. (citing Premier Mach. Co. v. Freeman, 84 F.2d 425 (lst Cir.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business

2007]

PATENT ROYALTY PAYMENT RISKS

in the suit.4 3 Freeman was then forced to issue disclaimers on

the invalidated claims and surrendered his original patent to
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for reissue
with amended claims. 44 Meanwhile, Altvater apparently continued marketing infringing machines, while paying royalties
as per the injunction order arising from the first suit. The royalties must have been inadequate from Freeman's perspective
as he sued Altvater again for infringement and demanded specific performance of the original license agreement. 45 Nonetheless, the suit backfired on Freeman in that the District
Court found that: (i) the machines did not infringe the reissued patents; (ii) the partial invalidation of the claims of the
original patent in the Premier Machine Company litigation
constituted an "eviction" of Freeman from his monopoly position of the patents under the terms of the Altvater license
agreement; (iii) the Altvater license agreement terminated
upon Freeman's surrender of the original patent in the reissue
procedure with the USPTO; (iv) Altvater had not made the
reissued patents the basis for a new license; (v) Altvater's continued payment of royalties was not acceptance of a new license or ratification that the old one continued in force, but
rather performed only under protest and pursuant to the injunction from the earlier suit; and (vi) the reissued patents
were invalid. 46 Some of these findings were based on allegations in counterclaims and a request for declaratory judgment
by Altvater, while others were based on affirmative defenses.
43. Id. (citing Premier Mach. Co. v. Freeman, 84 F.2d 425 (lst Cir.
1936)).
44. Id. at 361-62 (citing Premier Mach. Co. v. Freeman, 84 F.2d 425 (1st
Cir. 1936)).
45. Id. at 362. The Court is simply not clear on exactly what triggered
the second lawsuit that led to the instant appeal. It may be that the original
injunction provided that Altvater pay royalties on the machines he had already sold in violation of the license agreement while ceasing to continue
marketing such machines. His continued sale of machines afterwards may
have been enough for Freeman to take him back to court for an order to
discontinue such sales. However, one would presume that that would have
taken the form of a request for the court to find Altvater in contempt if he
were simply disregarding the original injunction. A more plausible story is
that Altvater was marketing a different machine that Freeman believed also
violated the now reissued patents. Two reissue patents - Nos. 20,202 and
20,203 - were issued in the place of the original partly invalidated patent.
Id. at 360 n.1.
46. Id at 362.
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In addition, Altvater prayed that even if the reissued patents
were found valid and his machines infringing, then the original license agreement would be extended to the machines at
issue. 4 7 Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Freeman's bill
of complaint and granted Altvater's prayer of counterclaim. 48
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's decision. But upon rehearing, the Eighth Circuit held that when the District Court found that the license
had been terminated and there was no infringement under
the reissued patents, all of the other issues in the counterclaim
and request for declaratory judgment became moot. 49 On the

rationale that there was no longer any justiciable controversy
on the mooted issues, the Eighth Circuit modified the District
Court's decree to remove the provisions holding that Freeman
had been evicted from his monopoly by the decision in Premier
Machine Company,50 and that the reissued patents were invalid.-5
Altvater appealed the modification of the decree to the
Supreme Court which took the case to clarify an earlier hold52
ing in ElectricalFittings Corporationv. Thomas & Betts Company,
5
3
that it believed was being misinterpreted. In that case, a Dis54
trict Court had held that a patent was valid but not infringed.
The infringement defendant appealed even though it had prevailed in its defense of no infringement because it was concerned that the trial court had found at least one of the claims
of the patent to be valid. 5 5 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal because the petitioners "had
been awarded all the relief to which they were entitled. '56 The
Supreme Court took the case on certiorari and held that, despite the general rule that prevailing parties may not appeal
findings that were unnecessary to support a ruling or decree,
in the case where such findings are themselves part of the rul47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Premier Mach. Co. v. Freeman, 84 F.2d 425 (1st Cir. 1936).
Altvater, 319 U.S. at 362-63.
Elec. Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).
Altvater, 319 U.S. at 363.
Elec. Fittings Co., 307 U.S. at 241-42.
Id. at 242.
Id.
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ing or decree, the prevailing party may appeal to have those
findings reversed or removed from a decree. 5 7 The Altvater
Court seemed concerned that the Eighth Circuit misinterpreted Electrical Fittings Corp. to stand for the proposition that
courts can never issue broad findings beyond whatever narrow
holding is actually needed to decide the plaintiffs claims. The
Altvater Court sought to clarify the prior holding by clearly stating that trial courts may, indeed must, adjudicate all of the live
claims before them - whether they arisefrom the original claims of
the plaintiff orfrom any counterclaimsfiled by the defendant. Thus,
on the facts of Altvater itself, the infringement defendants had
filed a number of counterclaims and the trial court was
obliged to rule on all of them. This included, of course, those
in the form of declaratory judgments. More importantly, it
also included counterclaims such as the ruling of invalidity of
the reissued patents that would have been moot and nonjusticiable if raised as affirmative defenses once the court found
that there was no valid license agreement and that Altvater's
58
machines did not infringe the reissued patents.
Altvater also addressed the license estoppel doctrine, at
least in passing. The Court restated the standard doctrine
without necessarily committing to it.5 9 However, the Court asserted that the doctrine was not implicated because the lower
courts had already found that there was no license under the
57. Id. Further, the reason that the finding of validity in the case was
unnecessary was that the Supreme Court in both this case and in Altvater
took pains to establish that while it is necessary for a patent infringement
plaintiff to show that his patent is both valid and infringed, the infringement
defendant need only show that eitherthe patent was invalid or not infringed.
See Elec. Fittings Co., 307 U.S. at 242; Altvater, 319 U.S. at 363. In Altvater the
Court cited with approval the Second Circuit's discussion in Cover v. Schwartz,
133 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1942), to the effect that federal courts actually stray
outside of their Article III jurisdiction to hear only cases or controversies
when they first reach a finding of non-infringement - which should dispose
of the case - yet then continue on to adjudicate the validity of the patent:
"To hold a patent valid if it is not infringed is to decide a hypothetical case."
Altvater, 319 U.S. at 363.
58. Altvater, 319 U.S. at 363-64.
59. See id. at 364 ("It is said that so long as petitioners are paying royalties
they are in no position to raise the issue of invalidity - the theory being that
as licensees they are estopped to deny the validity of the patents and that so
long as they continue to pay royalties, there is only an academic, not a real
controversy, between the parties.").
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reissued patents. 60 The Court then raised the critical issue of
"coercion" that would echo all the way down to MedImmune,
when it found that even though Altvater paid royalties under a
license he believed to be invalid, he did so only on pain of
violating the lower court's injunction order and risking treble
damages as a now willful infringer. 6 1 For emphasis, the Court
cited the relatively new Declaratory Judgment Act, claiming
that the law was passed "to afford relief against such peril and
'62
insecurity.
Another theme can be derived from Altvater, however,
which is that a material change in circumstances can be the
grounds for limiting the doctrine of licensee estoppel. The
doctrine was always posited as a generalrule, not as an absolute
bar. It was an equitable rule to prevent licensees from trying to
keep the benefits of a patent license while simultaneously trying to destroy the patent. However, as in most equitable doctrines, courts must use balancing tests to decide whether and
how to apply licensee estoppel. For example, where a patent
has been invalidated by other parties, a licensee should not
have to keep paying royalties based solely on that patent.
Thus, where a licensee stops paying royalties and is sued by the
patent owner/licensor under such a scenario, surely the licensee must be able to raise the defense that the patent has in fact
already been invalidated. Similarly, where other material
changes are brought to light - perhaps fraud in the procurement of the license, or even of the patent itself from the
USPTO - the licensee should be able to challenge the validity
of the patent. The rationale for this is that if there were a
failure of consideration or the basis of the bargain has been
corrupted or frustrated, then the licensee can argue that it is
not getting what it bargained for, or indeed that the contract
should be held unenforceable or voided. Absent changed circumstances, the general principles of freedom to contract
should apply and licensees should not be allowed to challenge
the patent just because they no longer like the bargain they
struck.
Wrapping up the early post World War II era's support for
the doctrine of licensee estoppel (and for strong patents and
60. Id. at 364-65.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 365.
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enforceable license agreements generally), the 1950 case of
63
Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.
reiterated the "general rule... that the licensee under a patent
license agreement may not challenge the validity of the li64
censed patent in a suit for royalties due under the contract."
It also confirmed the antitrust or price-fixing exception to this
general rule, citing 65 two cases that followed Sola in 1947 Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co. and
MacGregorv. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. 66 Hazeltine likely represented the high point of licensor/patent owner
favor by the Supreme Court. Justice Douglas wrote an impassioned dissent, joined by Justice Black, that foreshadowed the
return of the public interest perspective in judicial review of
67
patent and license arrangements in the 1960s.

In sum, the cases through Hazeltine endorsed the doctrine
of licensee estoppel, 68 but allowed it to be either disregarded
or held inapplicable where there were materially changed circumstances or bad acts of the licensor. Additionally, there was
no clear precedent that a licensee could bring a challenge to
the patents as a plaintiff based on such changed circumstances.
Rather, this narrow, developing exemption to the general doctrine of licensee estoppel seemed to exist only as a defense
once the licensor had brought an infringement or specific performance action against the licensee. However, the 1960s
would bring their social and political upheaval even into this
63. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950). The case is often cited for one of its other important holdings - that
there is no patent misuse when royalties are structured as a percentage of all
sales by licensee regardless of whether the products sold embody the licenses
patents. Id. at 834. As we will see, both holdings mentioned here have not
fared well in the ensuing years.
64. Id. at 836.
65. See id.
66. Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394
(1947); MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947).
67. Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 836-40 (Douglas, J.,dissenting) ("Mr.Justice Brandeis and Chief Justice Stone.. .were alert to the danger that business - growing bigger and bigger each decade - would fasten its hold more
tightly on the economy through the cheap spawning of patents and would
use one monopoly to beget another through the leverage of key patents.").
68. Without ever establishing whether it arises from federal, state, or local law.
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technical corner of law represented by patents and licensing
arrangements.
B.

The Death of Licensee Estoppel?: Lear v. Adkins

By the 1960s, the Supreme Court was swinging towards
greater concern over the interaction of state law doctrines in
contract and unfair competition and the federal patent system.
While the Sola Court had clearly articulated that federal antitrust law and policy would trump state contract law doctrines
such as licensee estoppel, 6 9 the latter was not held to be in
conflict or superseded by federal patent law and policy (which
might be perceived to seek to only enforce valid patents and
encourage challenges to invalid ones). Thus, the exceptions
to the "general rule" of licensee estoppel were fairly limited
going into the 1960s.
In 1964, however, two companion cases were handed
down by a Supreme Court that seemed to be newly invigorated
to do battle against overreaching false monopolies whether
arising from invalid patents, onerous license terms, or de facto
patent-like monopolies enforced under state unfair competition laws. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.70 and Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 7 1 both involved uniquely shaped light-

ing fixtures which were originally the subject of a mechanical
patent and a design patent, respectively, but both of which patents were invalidated pursuant to an affirmative defense of invalidity by the infringement defendants in the trial court in
each case. However, in each case, the presumed patent owners had also brought state law unfair competition claims
against the defendants because the defendants' products were
essentially indistinguishable from the plaintiffs' products. The
Court in each case overturned the unfair competition findings
of the lower courts because the injunctions and accounting
awards flowing from those findings impermissibly frustrated
the balanced policy objectives of the federal copyright and patent systems between innovators and the public, noting in
Compco: "Today we have held. .that when an article is unprotected by a patent or copyright, state law may not forbid others
to copy that article. To forbid copying would interfere with
69. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 177 (1942).
70. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
71. Cornpco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution
and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain." 72 In essence, the Supreme Court
was showing great interest in reviving and enforcing a robust
public domain.
Then, in 1969, the other shoe dropped. While Sears and
Compco did not involve license agreements, and thus had no
specific impact on licensing, the Supreme Court rewrote its
history as to interpreting the doctrine of licensee estoppel and
overruled Hazeltine in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins. 73 Reaching back to a

set of cases from the 1800s that were seemingly hostile to licensee estoppel and predated the cycle of estoppel friendly cases
starting with Harvey in 1905 (where our story started above),
the Lear Court argued that a better balance between the rights
of patent owners/licensors and the public interest needed to
be struck.
The case was based around an odd fact pattern in which
the Lear aviation company hired an engineer, Adkins, specifically to create a better gyroscope, yet expressly allowed him to
keep ownership to any patentable inventions arising from his
work.7 4 Lear and Adkins entered into an agreement that Adkins would grant Lear a license to all he ideas he might develop "'on a mutually satisfactory royalty basis."' 7 5 Adkins later
filed a patent application and the parties entered into a more
definitive license agreement, conditioned on the ultimate issu76
ance of the patent or any subsequent finding of invalidity.
However, Adkins' application got caught up in the usual back
72. Id. at 237.
73. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969).
74. Id. at 655-57. Today, unless the engineer was such a superstar that he
could negotiate to retain ownership of his inventions made on the company's time and as part of his job, engineers like Adkins would sign an invention assignment agreement giving all right and title to such inventions to the
employer. Further, although it was not clearly addressed in the Court's
opinion, it is odd that Lear did not attempt to rely on the common law
"hired to invent" exception to the standard "shop rights" doctrine that
would have granted ownership of Adkin's invention to Lear as a matter of
common law. Of course, an express allocation of ownership of the invention
to Adkins by Lear officials, as it sounds like may have happened, would override this common law allocation. See id. at 657.
75. Id. at 657.
76. Id.
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and forth with the examiners at the USPTO and did not issue
until six years after he filed it.77 During this time, the company became convinced that the patent would never issue and
declared that they would cease royalty payments, which they
did shortly thereafter. 7 8 In 1960, Adkins' patent finally issued
and he sued Lear for the royalties owed per the license agreement. The company sought to defend itself at least in part by
challenging the validity of the patent, which was rejected by
the trial court on the basis of licensee estoppel. 79 Upon a
complicated set of cross appeals, the California Supreme
Court ultimately concluded that the license agreement was
valid and that Lear was estopped from challenging the patent
as an affirmative defense.8 0
The case was then appealed to the U.S Supreme Court.
The Court's new interest in the public domain was highlighted
in its description of the issue available for its review: "[T]he
only issue open to us is raised by the court's reliance upon the
doctrine of estoppel to bar Lear from proving that Adkins'
ideas were dedicated to the common welfare by federal law."8 1
From that starting point, the Lear Court undertook a somewhat revisionist view of its own history in interpreting the licensee estoppel doctrine. It acknowledged that a very early
case, Kinsman v. Parkhurst,82 adopted a licensee/assignee doctrine of estoppel,8 3 but pointed out that a later 1891 case, St.
Paul Plow Works v. Starling,8 4 "did not even question the right
of the lower courts to admit the licensee's evidence showing
that the patented device was not novel." 8 5 Further, in a footnote to its citation of Kinsman, the Lear Court cited two other
early cases predating St. Paul Plow Works - Eureka Co. v. Bailey
Co. 8 6 and Dale Tile Manufacturing Co. v. Hyat 8 7 - as "cases
77. Id. at 658
78. Id. at 659-60.
79. Id. at 660.
80. Id. at 660-61.
81. Id. at 662.
82. Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. 289 (1855).
83. Id. (where the licensee/assignee had already profited greatly from
sales of the covered machine, the Court queried why a new finding of invalidity of the underlying patent would affect the assignee's profits already collected.)
84. St. Paul Plow Works v. Starling, 140 U.S. 184 (1891).
85. Lear, 395 U.S. at 663.
86. Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co., 78 U.S. 488 (1870).
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which enforced patent licenses without a thorough consideration of the estoppel issues that were presented."8 8 Finally, it
rolled out a case that "found the doctrine of patent estoppel so
inequitable that it refused to grant an injunction to enforce a
licensee's promise never to contest the validity of the underlying patent."8 9 That case, Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully,90
was then quoted approvingly for its public interest perspective:
"'It is as important to the public that competition should not
be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a
really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly.' "91

These early cases require a brief analysis to place them
into better context however. First, Kinsman is a bit different
than a straightforward licensee estoppel case. The agreement
at issue was not a license agreement at all, but rather a kind of
partnership agreement between a patent owner and his partial
assignee. 9 2 The partners were primarily allocating their responsibilities to jointly bring patented ginning machines to
market. 93 Their agreement mentioned nothing about a license, because, of course, there was no license as the partners
were now co-owners of the patent at issue. 9 4 There was evidence of bad faith by the assignee/partner/co-venturer (Kinsman) together with a third party (Goddard) and ultimately the
patent owner/partner/co-venturer (Parkhurst) brought an action against Kinsman and Goddard to recover monies owed to
him under the agreement and to allege other violations of the
partnership agreement which now constitute patent infringement.95 The lower court ruled against Kinsman and Goddard
and ordered an accounting on the basis of monies owed to
Parkhurst from sales already completed. The defendants then
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Kinsman Court reported
the principle basis of the appeal as that "Parkhurst was not the
87. Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46 (1888).

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Lear, 395 U.S. at 663 n.11.
Id. at 663.
Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
Lear, 395 U.S. at 663-64 (quoting Pope, 144 U.S. at 234).
Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. 289, 290-92 (1855).
Id.

94. Id.

95. Id. at 292.
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original and first inventor of the thing patented." 96 Whether
this was meant as a novelty challenge to the patent or a fraud
allegation was unclear. But that was of no moment because
the Court found that the invalidity of the patent was essentially
irrelevant to the issue of an accounting for sales already completed.9 7 Most important, even as the Court then proceeded
to raise an estoppel against the defendants for using invalidity
as a defense, this was simply not the same as the estoppel involved in licensee estoppel cases:
Moreover, we think the defendants are estopped from alleging that invalidity. They have made and sold these machines under the complainant's title and for his account; and
they can no more be allowed to deny that title and retain the
profits to their own use, than an agent, who has collected a
debt for his principal, can insist on keeping the money, upon
an allegation that the debt was not justly due. 9
The Lear Court did not call Kinsman a licensee estoppel
case per se, but it included it as part of its discussion of the
doctrine of licensee estoppel and did not make clear the very
different nature of the parties' relationship in Kinsman from
that of licensor-licensee. The Court further marginalized Kinsman by stating that it "was decided before the Sherman Act
made it clear that the grant of monopoly power to a patent
owner constituted a limited exception to the general federal
policy favoring free competition." 99 This is true, but it is hard
to see what bearing federal antitrust law would have had on
the facts and outcome of Kinsman even if it had been in place
at the time. In fact, Kinsman is arguably even more help to
supporters of licensee estoppel than the Lear Court may have
realized. In raising the agency analogy; the Kinsman Court
both introduced the idea that assignees and licensees may be a
kind of agent to the assignor's or licensor's principal, as applicable, and thus may not keep that which it has received in
charge for its principal regardless of whether the transactions
96. Id.
97. Id. at 292-93 ("Having actually received profits from sales of the patented machine, which profits the defendants do not show have been or are
in any way liable to be affected by the invalidity of the patent, its validity is
immaterial.").
98. Id. at 293.
99. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663 (1969).
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with third parties are legal.10 0 Essentially, the Kinsman Court
seemed concerned about allowing a windfall or unjust enrichment to Kinsman (and Goddard by extension). This seems a
correct way to think about licensees who have already collected payments on goods sold under what they now want to
claim is an invalid patent. In many cases, the very prices they
charged to the end user may have been inflated based on the
existence of what even the licensee may have been representing as a valid patent. To allow the licensee to have realized the
benefit of the patent's pricing power and then try to withhold
the agreed to royalties on the already received revenues based
on a defense that the patent was actually invalid during the
sales period, would amount to an impermissible windfall or
unjust enrichment to the licensee at the licensor's expense.
This says little, of course, about the equities of a situation
where the licensee wants to challenge the patent to avoid paying royalties on future sales.
The next case in chronological order, Eureka, did not "seriously consider" the estoppel doctrine simply because there
was no clear challenge to the patent and so the Supreme
Court did not review the issue. The estoppel type language
that arose was not licensee estoppel in the sense of a defense
of patent invalidity, but a different kind of licensee estoppel
that arises in later cases where the challenge is to whether licensee's products in fact would infringe the patent but for the
license. Eureka also involved reissued patents, which appear
repeatedly as a problem in license disputes and constitute one
of my "changed circumstances" that can trigger a valid dispute
for an existing licensee and limit estoppel claims. The Eureka
Court was nonetheless highly skeptical of the licensee's defense that its products did not infringe the reissued patent,
especially since the licensee had presented the licensor with
samples of the actual machine and both parties agreed that it
was covered by the license. 1 1 Further, it did not use the term
"estoppel" but merely stated that "we are not at all satisfied
that, in equity, [defendant] can be permitted to set up this
100. See Kinsman, 59 U.S. at 293. The Court then cited cases where agents
who received monies or property in entirely illegal transactions were still not
allowed to use the illegality of the activities as a defense against their principals who sought an accounting. Id.
101. Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co., 78 U.S. 490, 491-92 (1870).
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defense, while it makes no attempt by cross-bill, or even in the
answer, to show that the agreements were obtained by fraud,
surprise, or imposition."1 0 2 Essentially, the Court was looking
for some kind of changed circumstance, or even new knowledge (such as that the agreement was obtained by a fraud),
before allowing the licensee to now argue that its machines
did not infringe the patent at issue. The defendant did allege
some fraud in its defense but it was an alleged fraud by the
patent owner on the USPTO to reissue the earlier patent with
new or different claims that should not have been allowed.
The Court asserted that such fraud allegations against the
USPTO could not have been raised in the instant proceeding
but would have to have been raised in "a direct suit to impeach
and set aside the patent. ' 10

3

This might be an early version of

a kind of licensee estoppel to challenge the enforceability of a
patent, and possibly the validity of it, but whatever it was, it was
a clear bar for the Court not merely a "very strong presumption" standard as the Lear Court seemed to describe it.104 Finally, the Eureka Court made it crystal clear that there simply
was no serious attempt by the defendant to challenge the patent as to novelty (and hence validity): "Some attempt is made
to assail the novelty of Allender's invention, but as no notice
was given of any such attempt, or of the witnesses or other
evidence by which that charge was to be supported, it cannot
be considered in this case." 0 5 Thus, I would not interpret this
102. Id. at 492.
103. Id. (citing Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788(1869)).
104. Lear, 395 U.S. at 663 n.ll. The "strong presumption" language actually appeared in the Eureka Court's speculation about the defendant's intent
or motivation in attempting to argue that its machines were not covered by
the reissued patent:
After making the agreement in this case, an agreement made on
due deliberation, the defendant being engaged in the business of
making the machines before it took the license, an agreement manifestly intended to adjust conflicting rights, and after furnishing
one of the machines as a sample of what it proposed to do under
that agreement, and after having made and sold five hundred of
them, there arises a very strong presumption that the denial that
anything in those machines is covered by plaintiffs patent is made
to support an unwillingness to pay the royalty which it had agreed

to pay.
Eureka, 78 U.S. at 491-92.
105. Eureka, 78 U.S. at 492.
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as any statement by the Court as to whether it accepted or rejected licensee estoppel as a general rule, but rather that it
declined to consider the entire question of the defendant raising a novelty/validity challenge to the patent as it was inade10 6
quately presented.
The other case that Learcited for lack of thorough consideration of estoppel issues "presented" was Dale Tile Manufacturing Co. v. Hyatt.'0 7 Like Lear's characterization of Eureka, it
seems odd to say that the Dale Tile Court did not give "thorough consideration" of licensee estoppel issues, as if that
Court were expressing some reservation or uncertainty about
the doctrine or how to apply it. That is simply not the case.
The Lear Court did correctly state that the Dale Tile Court affirmed the decision of a New York state court to invoke licensee estoppel, but then continued on to say that this was because "the estoppel question presented was one which involved only state law."10 8 This mischaracterizes the Dale Tile
Court's position. It was not as though that Court considered
there to be a different estoppel doctrine for federal versus
state law, and was thus only affirming a state law version.
Rather, the Dale Tile Court appeared to believed that licensee
estoppel - at least at the time it was deciding the case - was

always a state law issue because patent licenses were always state
law matters.109 In other words, disputes over patent licenses
simply did not arise under federal patent law, but rather only
under state contract law. 1 10 Thus, a federal doctrine of licensee estoppel was impossible since there was no federal law governing patent license agreements,11 and disputes over such
106. Additionally, the Eureka Court seemed comfortable applying estoppel
type principles to clearly presented issues. In essence, it seemed to have
viewed all of the defendant's attempts to raise affirmative defenses to the
plaintiffs charges of failure to pay and infringement as just so many evasive
maneuvers of a party that was not willing to pay its fair and legally binding
obligations. The Court was happy to bar these on estoppel type theories.
107. Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46 (1888).
108. Lear, 395 U.S. at 663 n.11.
109. Dale TiLe, 125 U.S. at 52.
110. Id. ("[I]t is clearly established, by a series of decision of this court,
that an action upon [a patent license] as that here sued on is not a case
arising under the patent laws.").
111. Id. at 53 (quoting Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1850)
("[Tlhe dispute in this case does not arise under any act of congress; nor
does the decision depend upon the construction of any law in relation to
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agreements did not arise under the federal patent (or other)
laws.
In the penultimate case of the Lear Court's review of 19th
century estoppel precedents - St. Paul Plow Works - the Lear

Court alleged that the case was "often cited as supporting the
estoppel doctrine [but] points clearly in the opposite direction" because it "did not even question the right of the lower
courts to admit the licensee's evidence showing that the patented device was not novel."' 12 This is facially wrong. The
problem was that the estoppel issue was simply not raised by
either party on appeal to the Supreme Court. Estoppel was
raised in the lower court by the plaintiff when the defendant
put evidence in to challenge plaintiffs patent, but the objec113
tion was overruled and the evidence as to novelty admitted.
Yet, in the opinion from the lower court, the judge seemed to
contradict this: "I have hesitated about going into the question
of novelty, but, there being in the contract of license no recital
or admission that plaintiff had invented the improvement in
sulky plows, and the plaintiff having joined issue on the defense of want of novelty set up in the answer, and not pleaded an
estoppel, I have reluctantly allowed the defendant to introduce
evidence on that issue, and find that the plaintiffs improvement is not anticipated by any of the patents introduced in
evidence." 114 While I am no expert on pleading rules in the
1890s, I can hazard a guess that the plaintiff failed to formally
raise an estoppel claim in response to the defendant's challenge to plaintiffs patent in the defendant's original answer to
plaintiffs claims. Thus, even the trial court was precluded
from allowing the plaintiff to raise the estoppel claim during
the course of the trial when the evidence challenging novelty
was actually introduced into evidence by the defendant. Further, the trial court ruled for plaintiff on the patent validity
question anyway, and so the plaintiff did not appeal the ruling.
While the defendant certainly did appeal a number of the rulings of the lower court, including the court's finding that the
patents. It arises out of the contract stated in the bill; and there is no act of
congress providing for or regulating contracts of this kind. The rights of the
parties depend altogether upon common-law and equity principles.")).
112. Lear, 395 U.S. at 663.
113. St. Paul Plow-Works v. Starling, 140 U.S. 184, 189 (1891).
114. Id. at 190 (quoting Starling v. St. Paul Plow-Works, 29 F. 790, 792
(C.C. Minn. 1887)) (emphasis added).
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plaintiff's patent was valid, the defendant was certainly not going to question the lower court's rejection of the plaintiffs estoppel argument as improperly plead (presumably). At any
rate, the Supreme Court declined to review the validity finding
because it believed that the finding was a question of fact properly left to the lower court and not a matter of law for review.11 5 Even if the Supreme Court had reviewed the finding
of validity, it would not be proper for it to somehow interject
an estoppel to reject defendant's challenge to the patent. The
estoppel claim was the responsibility of the plaintiff to raise; if
he failed to properly do so, and given that the lower court's
ruling in this regard was not appealed by the plaintiff to the
Supreme Court, then it would be bizarre for the Supreme
Court to add this claim in at the appeal level of its own accord.
This brings us to Pope, the case cited by the Lear Court as
finding "the doctrine of patent estoppel so inequitable that it
refused to grant an injunction."'1 6 Again, this is facially
wrong. The Pope Court was not at all addressing the doctrine
of licensee estoppel such as a plaintiff might use it to bar a
defendant's challenge to a patent in a legal proceeding.
Rather the Court was rejecting a version of a "no contest" contractual clause in which a licensee agrees to not contest the
licensed patents no matter what. Thus, the Court, sitting in
equity not law, refused to require specific performance of the
defendant based on what it viewed as an unconscionable contract and license, perhaps even procured under misrepresentation, that precluded him from disputing or contesting the validity of the underlying patents: "The real question is whether
the defendant can estop himself from disputing patents which
may be wholly void, or to which the plaintiff may have no
shadow of title."' 17 This was a legitimate question, because the
contract at issue has essentially moved licensee estoppel from
an equitable doctrine that can be invoked by plaintiffs in the
right circumstances to a contractual obligation on the part of
the defendant. As I argue throughout this Article, estoppel
should always have been justified in each case where it was
raised by a plaintiff; it should never have been interpreted as
an absolute automatic bar or bright line rule. The other prob115. St. Paul, 140 U.S. at 196-97.
116. Lear, 395 U.S. at 663.
117. Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233 (1892).
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lem with the contract language at issue in Pope was that it
seemed to restrict even the standard limitations on licensee
obligations where the underlying patent had been invalidated
by other parties. Essentially, the Pope Court was highly concerned that the defendant/licensee had unwittingly stripped
himself of all legal rights to defend himself against even the
most specious of claims that the plaintiff/licensor might come
up with: "It is as important to the public that competition
should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his
monopoly; and it is a serious question whether public policy
permits a man to barter away beforehand his right to defend
against unjust actions or classes of actions, though, in an individual case, he may doubtless assent that a judgment be rendered against him, even without notice."' 1 8 Finally, the context of the case included evidence in the record that Gormully,
the licensee, might have been bamboozled by Pope Manufacturing Company into signing the contract without fully understanding that he was literally signing away his rights.1 1 9
Having set up an alternative universe of precedents that it
sometimes misconstrued to oppose the doctrine of licensee estoppel, the Lear Court then dismissed the Harvey and Hazeltine
cases as if they were aberrations.' 20 Further, the Court asserted that the Hazeltine Court "ignored the teachings of a series of decisions this Court had rendered during the 45 years
since Harvey had been decided." 121 Essentially, the Lear Court
exaggerated the reasonable limitations and parameters that
courts were placing around an otherwise unfettered licensee
estoppel doctrine - "each time a patentee sought to rely upon
his estoppel privilege. . .[we] created a new exception"' 22 until it could claim that "the estoppel doctrine had been so
118. Id. at 234. Note that the Lear Court cited only the first part of this
important quote, and seemed to spin it out of context to sound like a rant
against patents generally. See Lear, 395 U.S. at 693-94.
119. Pope, 144 U.S. at 237 ("The testimony...was fully reviewed by the
court below in its opinion, and the conclusion reached that the contract 'was
an artfully contrived snare to bind the defendant in a manner which he did
not comprehend at the time he became a party to it.'" (quoting Pope Mfg.
Co. v. Gormully, 34 F. 877, 883-84 (C.C. I1. 1888))).
120. See Lear, 395 U.S. at 664.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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eroded that it could no longer be considered the 'general
rule,' but was only to be invoked in an ever-narrowing set of
circumstances."' 123 But, the Court appeared to ignore the nature of "general rules": they are general because they generally
apply, but not necessarily in every specific situation.
To further buttress its claims for a "seriously eroded" estoppel doctrine, the Lear Court tossed a few more cases, this
time from the early 20th century, onto the fire. Westinghouse
Electric & Manufacturing Company v. Formica Insulation Company12 4 was supposed to limit the estoppel doctrine by allowing
an assignor of a patent, who now wanted to challenge the patent, to introduce prior art to narrow a claim in the patent (although not to invalidate the patent).125 The Lear Court ran a

bit roughshod over this case too. The FormicaCourt did a nice
nuanced job of working through assignor estoppel issues and
came up with a sensible set of guidelines. As a preliminary
matter, it is critical to note the different equities at play as between assignorestoppel and licensee estoppel. In the former, an
inventor or patent owner has transferred title to the patent to
another party. The Formica Court aptly analogized this to an
assignment of title to land. 12 6 Surely, the patent assignor cannot deny that valid title was conveyed to the underlying patent
anymore than a selling land owner can later deny that valid
title was conveyed to the property covered by the transferred
deed. If they could, then equally surely must the assignee in
both cases be able to demand all payment back from the assignor for the thing purportedly conveyed (but now denied).
Contrast this with a license situation where the licensee is not
at all in control of, or representing anything about, the patent
being licensed. To reiterate a discussion above, the clearest
equitable issue to ground licensee estoppel is instead that the
licensee is a kind of agent to the licensor's principal and cannot have profited from the benefit of that agency (having
rights to market a product that are not freely available to everyone else) and then deny such agency when the time for payment of royalties for the agency "right" comes nigh. Thus, at
123. Id.
124. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S.
342 (1924).
125. Lear, 395 U.S. at 664-65.
126. Formica, 266 U.S. at 349-50.
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one level, assignorestoppel cases have little bearing on licensee
estoppel cases, despite the Lear Court's efforts to gloss over
1 27
this point.
However, the Formica Court agreed that the assignor
should not be estopped from every crazy interpretation of the
scope of the patent claims that the assignee might bring as
against the assignor for infringement of the assigned patent. 128
In other words, just because the assignor is estopped from denying the overall validity of the patent (akin to a seller of land
later denying that he conveyed valid title), he should not be
constrained in what he believes to be legitimate non-infringing
activities just because the assignee claims that the scope of the
assigned patents reaches to these activities. Thus, assignors are
not estopped from bringing evidence that goes to the scope of
the claims, to raise the defense that assignor's products do not
actually infringe the patent. Assignors are estopped, however,
from bringing evidence for a defense that the assigned patent
is invalid. Justice Taft, writing for the Court, acknowledged
that "[t] he distinction may be a nice one but seems to be workable." 1 29

Certainly, one can foresee that assignors will be

tempted to interpret the scope of the claims effectively out of
existence, but this will simply be a matter that courts would
have to be vigilant about. At the same time, there is a bright
line rule to this: as a formal matter, the assignor cannot articulate its defense as one based on the invalidity of the patent, but
rather only as one based on the non-infringement of his products. This again raises the crucial difference between assignors
and licensees in estoppel matters. While a licensee may be
seen, based on the circumstances, to have been presented with
127. Note that some exclusive licenses may be the functional equivalent of
an assignment, and thus some licenses may be seen as assignments. This
blurring does not change my analysis here, for the point is simply to distinguish situations where the party who procured the patent in the first place,
and then assigned or exclusively licensed it to someone else, now wants to
deny the validity of the patent so as to practice the covered invention with
impunity (despite having assigned or licensed away this very right), from
situations where a licensee who had nothing to do with procuring the patent
nonetheless negotiates a license to the patent with appropriate due diligence and sophistication, and then later wants to challenge the validity of
the patent simply because he now realizes the license was a bad bargain for
him.
128. See Formica, 266 U.S. at 350-5 1.
129. Id. at 351.
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a patent and then made a voluntary decision that its products
might infringe the claims of that patent (and thus warrant taking a license), an assignor has only committed itself to having
sold good title in a valid patent and, perhaps, some representations about the scope of the patent's claims. This then set up
the Formica Court's further delimitation of the doctrine of assignor estoppel peculiar to the facts of the case before it. The
assignee had assigned a patent application, not an issued patent. The Court worried that if even an issued patent's claims
are harder to know the scope of than, say, land that has been
duly surveyed, then it will be that much harder for the assignor
to know the scope of the yet-to-be-issued patent arising from
his assigned application. 130 In particular, because the scope of
the claims may ultimately be either curtailed or enlarged
131
through the patent procurement process with the USPTO,
the Court believed that an inventor who assigned his application before the issuance of the patent, and then had little to
no role in the procurement process, may have genuine questions about the scope of the final issued patent with regard to
his products. Accordingly, he should not be estopped from
challenging the scope of the final issued patent, other than as
to the scope of claims that he clearly intended to convey and
2
13
assign to the assignee.'

The Lear Court raised a second assignor estoppel case to continue

Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co.1 33
130. Id. at 352-53.

131. Although today any enlargement of the patent application's scope
after filing will lose the applicant the benefit of the initial filing date for
invention priority purposes against other inventors who claim to have invented first.
132. Although, even here, if any conveyed claims are rejected by the
USPTO and not issued as part of the final patent, then the assignor is not
estopped from defending against infringement by bringing evidence that his
product cannot infringe unissued or rejected claims. See Formica, 266 U.S. at
354-55. The Formica Court spent little time on the interesting issue of
whether assignor estoppel should even apply in this case as the alleged infringer of the patent, Formica, is a corporation in which O'Conor, the original inventor and assignor of the patent (when he worked at Westinghouse),
was only one shareholder among others. See id. at 355. One can see an
inventor/assignor trying to "hide" behind a corporation to avoid assignor
estoppel, but on the other hand, one can also see the equitable limitations
on allowing an inventor/assignor to "taint" every venture and entity that he
might happen to become associated with in the future.
133. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
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nudging along its argument that licensee estoppel had been
eroded out of existence. In this case, the reasonably foreseeable abuse of the Formica rule that assignors would simply become more aggressive in attacking the scope of their assigned
patent's claims to effectively read them out of existence, was
put to the test. Mr. Marcalus invented a purportedly new box
making machine while employed by Scott Paper Co., and then
left that company after the patent issued and he had assigned
it to Scott Paper.13 4 He set up a competing box manufacturer,
Marcalus Manufacturing, and used a machine that Scott Paper
135
believed infringed the very patent he had assigned to them.
In defense to Scott Paper's infringement suit, Marcalus Manufacturing claimed that its new machine did not infringe the
assigned patent and offered evidence of an expired patent that
was claimed to be the basis for the new machine. 3 6 The expired patent had not been considered as part of the prior art
when the assigned patent was being procured from the
USPTO and arguably would have destroyed the assigned patent's novelty, preventing its issuance. 13 7 The trial court found
this to be a way for Mr. Marcalus to achieve by "indirection"
that which he would not have been able to achieve directly
because of assignor estoppel.13 8 The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed, finding the effective destruction of the assigned patent, through permissible "narrowing"
of its claims by Marcalus Manufacturing to show non-infringement, was just an unfortunate by-product of the proper limitation on assignor estoppel.1 39 The Supreme Court took the
case on certiorari and found that it could decide the case without disturbing or commenting on the scope of the Formica
rule. 140 In particular, "unlike Formica, the accused machine is
precisely that of an expired patent. Neither in that case nor in
134. Id. at 250-51.
135. Id. at 251.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 254 ("But in the circumstances of this case we find it unnecessary.., to determine whether.. .the doctrine of estoppel by patent assignment as stated by the Formica case should be rejected. To whatever extent
that doctrine may be deemed to have survived the Formica decision or to be
restricted by it, we think that case is not controlling here.").
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any other, so far as we are advised, was the doctrine of estoppel
applied so as to penalize the use of the invention of an expired
1 41
patent."
To dig a little deeper into the parties' arguments as summarized by the Court, it appears that Mr. Marcalus' patent was
novel as to an improvement on the expired patent, although
his issued patent may have seemed to encompass the claims of
the prior, but unknown at the time, patent.1 4 2 Marcalus Manufacturing, as defendant to the infringement suit, agreed to
estoppel as to claims that the improvements were invalid (or for
that matter that the entire patent was invalid), but not as to
defenses showing that the new machine did not infringe the
assigned patent, as it was limited by the scope and claims of
the expired patent, and thus did not extend to the improvements that may be the novel heart of his assigned patent. 143 In
this way, Marcalus Manufacturing was not questioning the
Formica rule, nor arguing that it did not apply to the case, but
merely showing how the rule should be applied.
Returning to the equitable basis of assignment estoppel,
as agreed to even by Justice Frankfurter in his spirited dissent
in the case, 1 4 4 patent assignors, like other conveyers of title,
should not be allowed to sell assignees an empty bill of goods.
In other words, whatever it is they purport to sell and convey
for value to the assignee, they cannot then later claim that it is
invalid or non-existent. That principle was upheld in Formica
and untouched in Marcalus. Exactly what was purported to be
conveyed from Mr. Marcalus to Scott Paper was not clear from
the case, although it sounded as if Mr. Marcalus and Scott Paper were both unaware of the expired prior art patent and
may have believed that Mr. Marcalus was conveying title to a
patent that covered all of the machine he developed while
working for Scott Paper. Formica provided that assignors are
not estopped from challenging claims that are ultimately rejected by the USPTO even though the assignor intended to
assign those claims as part of an unissued patent application.
But that was not the case in Marcalus. Instead, it seemed that
both Mr. Marcalus and Scott Paper engaged in the original
141. Id.

142. Id. at 253-54.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 258-64 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Business

NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AD BUSINESS

[Vol. 3:381

procurement and assignment of the patent in good faith, but
that, unbeknownst to them at that time, the patent would ultimately have very little value because of the later discovered
prior art patent. As a matter of infringement analysis, Marcalus Manufacturing cannot be found to have infringed the subject matter of an expired patent that was now part of the public domain - whose free use is a vital part of the public policy
goals of the patent system. Thus, Marcalus Manufacturing
must have been allowed to defend its new machine on the basis of noninfringement, even as it was estopped - by virtue of
Mr. Marcalus's role as the original assignor of the patentfrom denying the validity of what was sold to the assignee.
The Lear Court then turned to an analysis of Sola's antitrust based limitation of licensee estoppel, while also invoking
the "even more extensive scope" of the "'anti-trust exception' "145 as found in Katzinger and MacGregor. There is no
doubt that the "antitrust exception" had found a permanent
place in the licensee estoppel doctrine by this time. And yet,
this exception, together with some other limited exceptions or
clarifications around the doctrine such as the rejection of the
no-contest clause in the license agreement at issue in Pope,
failed to extinguish the doctrine of licensee estoppel, erode it
into meaninglessness, or eliminate the basic equitable principles at its core. What the Lear Court saw as a fatal chipping
away at the doctrine through all of the cases developing since
the 19th century, I see as only the normal developing, maturing, and proper cabining of any legal doctrine. A legal principle or rule is first articulated, and then it is applied in ever
expanding fashion until it reaches some boundaries wherein it
is clear that its own equitable powers of persuasion have attenuated enough that the equitable powers of another doctrine
that it has come in conflict with override the first doctrine's
power at that point in "jurisprudentialspace. " It is at that point or

line that the first doctrine has now had a boundary established
for it. Over time this boundary may shift as the equitable sense
of courts and the people change, but in many cases the heart
of the doctrine is not extinguished and there remains the paradigmatic cases that define it. It should not be viewed as a
death knell when the initial boundaries are discovered or even
145. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 666-67 (1969).
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changed over time, so long as the paradigmatic heart remains
compelling for the people and the courts.
The Lear Court, armed with only its revisionist history of
licensee estoppel cases (including assignor estoppel cases added in to bolster the sense of inevitability to its doctrinal erosion theory), then proceeded to overrule Hazeltine.1 46 At the
same time, it set up an entirely new rule for licensee estoppel
based on little more than speculation about how parties enter
into patent licenses, 1 4 7 a smattering of law review articles and
uncited cases presumably cited within those articles,1 48 and a
clear bias against patents and their owners.' 49 Essentially, the
Court framed this as a conflict between state contract law and
federal patent law, 1 50 which indeed it was. The real problems
in the opinion occurred when the Court took it upon itself to
speculate, in one telling paragraph, about the "most typical"
license situations:
It will simplify matters greatly if we first consider
the most typical situation in which patent licenses are
negotiated. In contrast to the present case, most
manufacturers obtain a license after a patent has issued. Since the Patent Office makes an inventor's
ideas public when it issues its grant of a limited monopoly, a potential licensee has access to the inventor's ideas even if he does not enter into an agreement with the patent owner. Consequently, a manufacturer gains only two benefits if he chooses to enter a

licensing agreement after the patent has issued.
First, by accepting a license and paying royalties for a
time, the licensee may have avoided the necessity of
defending an expensive infringement action during
the period when he may be least able to afford one.
Second, the existence of an unchallenged patent may
deter others from attempting to compete with the li51

censee.1
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 671.
See id. at 669-70.
See id. at 667, 668 n.13.
See id. at 669-71.
See id. at 668.
Id. at 669 (emphasis added).
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The problem with the Court's assessment in the first "benefit" is that it appears to only consider one side of the quid pro
quo of the "patent bargain" - the foundational principle that
society grants inventors a period of exclusivity to profit off
their inventions in exchange for the inventor's enabling disclosure of that invention and its transmission to the public domain, free for all to use, after the exclusive period ends. In the
quoted paragraph above, the Court seems to view patent exclusivity as a nuisance to be avoided by any means possible.
Yet, this ignores the fundamental premise for the patent bargain: inventors may well try to keep their inventions secret,
and profit off them for an unlimited period as trade secrets to
the detriment of society, in the absence of a compelling incentive to disclose them. If courts nip away at the value of this
incentive to inventors, or encourage others, including licensees, to game the system to diminish the value of the incentive
to inventors, then inventors may well begin deciding that the
benefits of the patent system are not enough and that it is better to try and work their inventions in secret indefinitely.
The Court's second "benefit" is at least more on the mark,
and actually supports my argument that the equities of the license situation at least demand that the licensee live up to its
end of the license agreement for the benefits it has already
received under the license and patent at the time it decides to
repudiate or dishonor the agreement. However, the Lear
Court spun this in a negative way by discussing the benefit of
only an "unchallenged" patent, as if patents only deter others
when they have not yet been challenged. Clearly a patent validated in a court proceeding should be dramatically even more
of a deterrent. Why is this not even mentioned? My suspicion
is that the Court looked askance at most patents and belied in
this passage that it thought most of them would be invalidated
if challenged.
The Court's negativity as to patents and their owners was
further substantiated when the Court turned to a discussion of
the equities involved when a patent owner/licensor seeks a
court's assistance in enforcing his license. Rather than leading
with presumably the majority of cases where the patent has
been obtained legitimately and the license fairly entered into,
the Court instead began with the example of "the licensor who
has obtained his patent through a fraud -on the Patent Of-
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fice." 152 The Court then attacked licensee estoppel by arguing
that "It is difficult to perceive why good faith requires that
courts should permit him to recover royalties despite his licensee's attempts to show that the patent is invalid." 15 " But this is
a bit of a straw man - who actually believes that courts should
enable these kinds of shenanigans? Further, from my analysis
of the entire set of licensee estoppel cases above, I think that
this kind of claim - fraud on the USPTO - could be brought
by the licensee without estoppel under two theories. First,
under a pure contract law analysis the licensee would not be
estopped from bringing evidence that the entire basis of the
bargain - the patent - was in fact a fraud. Now, if the licensee
was perfectly aware of the evidence that the patent was procured in fraud and still took the license, then perhaps estoppel
should still apply. This goes back to my suggestion that the
key test for when estoppel should be limited is when something new has happened or come to light during the course of
the license. If there are no new facts or changed circumstances from the time when the licensee entered into an arms
length license with reasonable diligence, other than the fact
that he no longer wishes to pay royalties or feels that ultimately
it was a bad bargain and he wants to repudiate it, why should
he be able to defend the eventual infringement and breach of
contract suit by now attacking the patent itself? Further, as
also discussed above, if he has benefited from the exclusivity of
the patent generally - certainly if he was an exclusive licensee,
but even if he was a non-exclusive licensee - he must not be
able to renege on paying royalties on money he received from
customers based on this exclusive or semi-exclusive position in
the marketplace.
Even when the Court turned to consider, as a secondary
matter, the "more typical cases, not involving conscious wrongdoing" it made the equities out to be almost entirely on the
put-upon licensee's side.' 5 4 After explaining what it deemed
the ex parte nature of patent procurement with the USPTO
and the presumption of validity afforded patents, the Court
152. Id. at 669.
153. Id. at 669-70.
154. Id. at 670 (emphasis added). At least the Court acknowledged that
most patent are not procured based on fraud. But rather than leaving it at
that, it had to qualify "wrongdoing" with "conscious" as if most patents are
based on at least an unconscious wrongdoing.
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suggested that this already stacked the deck in favor of patentees. 15 5 Thus, it concluded that "it does not seem to us to be
unfair to require a patentee to defend the Patent Office's judgment when his licensee places the question in issue .156
As a preliminary matter, I generally support the calls for
more post-grant patent opposition opportunities for members
of the public who object to a patent that has issued. I also
think that a general ability for members of the public to submit possible prior art to the USPTO when it considers a particular patent application is a good thing. However, when all is
said and done, and a patent has issued, any member of the
public who believes that their products or process infringe the
claims of the patent, but who also believes that the patent is
invalid, should continue as they are and defend an infringement suit if one materializes. It is true that some firms or individuals will feel that a reasonably low licensing fee or royalty
rate is preferable to the wild card of patent litigation costs and
potential damage awards. And this leads to what I have called
industry "shake down" licenses. But equally prevalent is the
"pay now or pay later" attitude that weighs whether a certain
payment now is better or worse than a potential payment
later.1 5 7 Absent a finding of willfulness, a losing patent infringement defendant will generally only have to pay whatever
a reasonable royalty would have been, plus perhaps interest
and other charges to make the patent owner whole (as if the
defendant had in fact entered into the license). Therefore,
one could equally say that licensees have an obligation of due
diligence to make sure that they really believe that the patent
is valid and that their products or processes will infringe it. If
that is the case, and no material circumstances change or new
facts come to light later, then it seems to me that the licensee
should live with his bargain like any other party to a contract.
Before finally turning to its disposition of the facts of the
case at hand, the Lear Court gave one more argument in favor
of dismantling the licensee estoppel doctrine that has contin155. See id.

156. Id.
157. The calculus involved in this decision can be complex and is heavily
reliant on three key variables: i) the strength of the patent (i.e., how likely is
it to be upheld or validated in court); ii) the likelihood that the potential
licensee's products or processes will be found to infringe (valid) claims of
the patent; and iii) the potential licensee's tolerance for risk.
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ued on through the debates over not just estoppel, but also
those culminating in MedImmune regarding the ability of licensees to bring declaratory judgment actions with essentially no
triggering event to try to invalidate the patent underlying the
license. To wit: "Licensees may often be the only individuals
with enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability
of an inventor's discovery." 158 This perspective may be true in
some cases. However, it may be equally true in others that
licensees - especially exclusive licensees - are the last individu-

als or organizations to have an incentive to challenge the patent, else they lose their exclusive position in the marketplace
when the patent owner/licensor loses his patent.1 5 9 So, the
licensee "watchdog" of the public interest might just choose to
muzzle himself.
Of course, the Court ultimately had to deal with the extra
complication that Adkins had licensed his unpatented invention to Lear even before an application was filed with the
USPTO. Thus, there were three time periods at issue for the
Court to consider whether royalties were owed by Lear. First,
the period before the patent issued. Second the patent term
itself. Third, and perhaps crossing over the other two, the period during the pendency of the infringement trial itself. The
Court ruled on the third period by speculating that if licensees
were required to keep paying royalties during a suit over the
license, then licensors would have incentive to "devise every
conceivable dilatory tactic."1 60 Perhaps so, but whichever way
a rule like this goes, someone will have an opportunity to game
the system. To the second question, and as the holding that
Lear is most known for, the Court found that "Lear must be
permitted to avoid the payment of all royalties accruing after
Adkins' 1960 patent issued if Lear can prove patent invalidity.'16 1 The holding as it appears is not in the form that it is
generally stated in the literature afterwards. Interestingly, the
latter form appeared in Lear earlier in the Court's analysis as it
158. Lear, 395 U.S. at 670. The Court then continued its general patent
and patent owner bashing with the colorful tag: "If [licensees] are muzzled,
the public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification." Id.
159. See, e.g.,
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel
and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 698-700 (1986).
160. Lear, 395 U.S. at 673.
161. Id. at 674.
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considered what other courts were doing: "Some courts have
gone further to hold that a licensee may notify the patent
owner that he is repudiating his agreement, regardless of its
terms, and may subsequently defend any action for royalties by
proving patent invalidity." 16 2 This "repudiate then invalidate"
approach has become a critical aspect of Lear's legacy (before
MedImmune). Yet, nothing about Lears clear formulation of its
own holding requires this, other than perhaps because the
case involved a repudiating licensee and holdings arguably
should be limited to the specific facts of the case as ajurisprudential matter. In theory, then, Learmay not have completely
eliminated licensee estoppel, although it certainly appeared to
have tried. It could be that neither the parties nor the Lear
Court expected licensees to bring declaratory judgment actions to challenge an underlying patent even while continuing
as licensees in good standing, as later happened in MedImmune. Finally, as to the first period for potential royalty payments by Lear - the pre-patent issuance period - the Court
punted the question back to the California state courts in part
because it was a matter of state law (to the extent that state law
protection of unpatented ideas is not pre-empted by the federal patent law system) and partly because the California Supreme Court did not rule on the issue as it had thought licensee estoppel applied to any attempt by Lear to challenge either
163
the patent or its earlier incarnation as a kind of trade secret.
Much of this Article has now been dedicated to cases leading up to and including Lear. This is not by accident or poor
design, but rather because Lear "settled" the doctrine of licensee estoppel essentially from when it was handed down in 1969
until this year's MedImmune decision. Despite its apparent attempts to do so, however, it did not also eliminate assignor
estoppel. 164 Before turning to MedImmune, we must briefly review a handful of cases in the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit that distinguished themselves from Lear in ways that
arguably kept a form of licensee estoppel alive, at least as to
non-repudiating licensees or licensees in good standing in the
intervening years.
162. Id. at 667.
163. Id, at 674-75.
164. See, e.g., Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
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C.

Lear's Aftermath in the Federal Circuit

In 1988's Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc.,16 5 the Federal Circuit
declined to extend Lear to allow a party to a settlement order
approved by a federal court as settlement of a patent dispute
to later attempt to renege on its payments under the order on
the basis of the invalidation of the underlying patents by a
third party. The Federal Circuit invoked the public policy interests of encouraging patent litigation settlements as well as
the doctrine of res judicata. Three years later, in Foster v.
Hallco Manufacturing Co., Inc., 1 66 the Federal Circuit overturned a district court ruling that a party to a consent decree,
which settled a patent dispute by finding the patents valid and
enforceable, could nonetheless challenge those patents in a

declaratory judgment action. In particular, the district court,
whether aware of the Federal Circuit's decision in Hemstreet or
not, nonetheless essentially ignored that court's ruling on res
judicata and instead relied on the general public interest policies articulated in Lear to allow the declaratory judgment challenge. The Federal Circuit then held that Lear did not abrogate res judicata, that there were additional public policy issues involved in settlement situations (as it had discussed in
Hemstreet), and that it alone could interpret Lear for the district
courts (except of course where the Supreme Court might further rule in the area).
In 1997, the Federal Circuit ventured a little further in
critiquing Lear in Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M.B.H. v. Shell Oil
Company.1 6 7 The court reiterated earlier rulings in the Supreme Court that licenses are primarily treated under state
contract law, rather than federal patent law. 1 68 It then noted
the Lear Court's skepticism to intellectual property,169 before
it asserted that Lear "requires this court to consider 'whether
overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated' by
enforcing [a] license."1 70 Based on this interpretation of its
duties under Lear, the Federal Circuit found that it could de165.
166.
167.
1997).
168.
169.
170.

Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Studiengesellschaft, M.B.H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561 (Fed. Cir.
See id. at 1567.
Id.
Id. (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)).
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tect "no significant frustration of federal patent policy by enforcing the 1987 license agreement [between the parties] to
the extent of allowing [the licensor] to recover royalties until
the date [licensee] first challenged the validity of the
claims." 171 In particular, the court then arguably revived a version of licensee estoppel by considering the actual equities involved with a decidedly less anti-IP eye than the Lear Court:
"this court must prevent the injustice of allowing Shell to exploit the protection of the contract and patent rights and then
later to abandon conveniently its obligations under those same
rights."'1 72 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that a "licensee.. .cannot invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine until it
(i) actually ceases payment of royalties, and (ii) provides notice to the licensor that the reason for ceasing payment of royalties is because it has deemed the relevant claims to be inva73
lid."1
In the opening years of the 2000s, the Federal Circuit decided two final cases in its sequence of interpretations of Lear
before Medlmmune reset the stage once again. In Flex-Foot, Inc.
v. CRP, Inc.,174 the Federal Circuit expanded its rulings on the
public policy importance of upholding the doctrine of resjudicata in the context of enforcement of settlement agreements
which contain license agreements and no-contest clauses. Specifically, the court added that contract estoppel, in addition to
res judicata principles, barred a party to a license from challenging a patent. that had been litigated over between the
same two parties three times, and from which a valid settlement agreement had been obtained that contained represen1 75
tations that the patents were valid.
Finally, in Gen-Probe Incorporated v. Vysis, Inc.,176 the Federal Circuit drew a line barring licensees in good standing
from bringing a challenge to the underlying patent as essentially a freestanding legal action under the Declaratory Judg171. Id. at 1568.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing numerous circuit courts that had reached the same conclusion).
174. Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
175. See id. at 1370.
176. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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ment Act.1 77 As a case study in the tendency of parties to push
and game the system in the wake of any new rule, the Gen-Probe
dispute revolved around a potential patent infringer, GenProbe, that took Lear to its logical and clearly intended conclusion and attempted to have it both ways: a covenant not to sue
from the patentee and control as plaintiff of a direct challenge
on the patents. As baldly summarized by Gen-Probe itself, the
tactic was indeed a brilliant move based on a reasonable interpretation of the Lear Court's overzealous attempt to rid the
law once and for all of licensee estoppel:
"This letter concerns the June 22, 1999 agreement between Vysis and Gen-Probe concerning the Collins Patents.
Since the date of that agreement, we have analyzed the Collins
Patents. Based upon that analysis, we have concluded that the
claims of the Collins Patents are invalid. Furthermore, we
don't believe that any product made, used or sold by GenProbe, either individually or in conjunction with others, infringes any claims [sic] of the patents that might ultimately be
determined to be valid.
Based on our prior dealings and conversations, we understand that Vysis disputes those positions. Therefore, concurrently with the delivery to you of this letter, Gen-Probe is filing
an action in the United States District Court seeking relief concerning the Collins Patents.
In order to preserve the status quo pending resolution of
the litigation, Gen-Probe and Chiron Corp. have exercised the
options [sic].. .to extend the license to Gen-Probe and Chiron
Corp. for purposes of their blood screening business. For the
same reason, Gen-Probe and Bayer Corp. have exercised the
option... to extend the license to Gen-Probe and Bayer Corp.
for purposes of their infectious disease testing business.
Gen-Probe has participated in the exercise of the foregoing options not because we believe the patents are valid, but
solely in order to preserve the status quo pending resolution
of the litigation. Based on present circumstances, Gen-Probe
and its allied parties expect to fulfill their obligations under
' 178
the licenses during the pendency of the litigation."
177. Id. at 1380 (interpreting Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201(a) (2000)).
178. Id. at 1378-79.
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Talk about crazy-making legal tactics to tweak your opponent! I actually started laughing out loud while retyping this
letter, as reproduced in the Gen-Probe opinion, as the sheer
brazenness of it - couched in eminently reasonable sounding
language of course - fully set in.

First off, while it was true that the license at issue was always more of a settlement license - as I define such in my taxonomy above - than a deal license, nonetheless there was
nothing legally coercive about the execution of the license.
Vysis and Gen-Probe had been involved in litigation regarding
other patents when Vysis was awarded U.S. Patent No.
5,750,338 (the '338 Patent) for a wholly unrelated technology.
Vysis used well developed drafting and communications strategies to avoid triggering a declaratory judgment action by GenProbe. To wit, rather than sending a cease and desist letter
asserting infringement and demanding either a cessation of
Gen-Probe's activities or the execution of a license agreement,
Vysis' President and CEO used the following language in a letter to his counterpart at Gen-Probe: "Our interest continues to
be to obtain resolution of all of the existing intellectual property issues at one time.. .To that end, I would like to bring to
your attention some additional, recently issued patent assets
under our control which we believe Gen-Probe should find of
interest. ' 179 After some back and forth which the Federal Circuit acknowledges could have caused Gen-Probe to "detect[ ]
a significant likelihood that it would be sued for infringement", Gen-Probe took a license to the '338 Patent and two
other related patents (collectively, the Collins Patents).1 8 0
This license appears to have been duly negotiated, in all likelihood with competent counsel assisting on both sides, given the
nature of the parties, and seemed to be relatively sophisticated. It provided for a $1.5M up-front payment and a running royalty of 3% on Gen-Probe's sales of licensed products. 8 1 Further, it granted Gen-Probe a six month option to
extend the terms and coverage of the license to its third party
allies in the DNA assay market.1 8 2 In sum, Gen-Probe knew
exactly what it was getting into and took the time to carefully
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id at 1377.
Id. at 1377-78.
Id. at 1378.
Id.
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negotiate and execute a reasonable patent license. Should it
not have been expected to analyze the Collins Patents before
entering into this license? If it had doubts about the patents
and whether its products would infringe those patents, it
should have undertaken further diligence, before deciding to
take the license or roll the dice in a possible infringement suit.
Fully understanding that Gen-Probe (and other parties) may
have taken the license as a pragmatic decision in the face of
the uncertainty provided by a patent infringement suit, I assert
that all of this nonetheless is simply the basis of the bargain for
the license as a contract. If Gen-Probe later became unhappy
with the deal, and provided that nothing happened to change
the circumstances (other than presumably Gen-Probe's delinquent diligence that was fully within its control), it should have
had no recourse other than to continue performing under the
license or to repudiate or breach it and then challenge the
patents in either an infringement suit brought by Vysis or a
declaratory judgment action brought by itself.
The second amazing part of Gen-Probe's letter was that it
was dated the last day its options under the license remained valid

and provided notice that it was exercising those options even as
it gave further notice that it was going to file a declaratoryjudgment
action the very next day to try to destroy the underlying patents. The

coup de grace of course, was the letter's insistence that all of
this was being done merely to "preserve the status quo" pending the outcome of litigation it was initiatingagainst the licensor.

Finally, although the letter did not directly express this fact,
competent counsel reading the letter would instantly have understood that Gen-Probe's language regarding its intention to
fulfill all of its obligations under the license was likely really
meant to signal to Vysis that the latter would have to sit back
and let Gen-Probe take the reins in litigation over the patents
via the declaratory judgment action, as Vysis would have no
grounds to bring its own patent infringement or breach of
contract suit against Gen-Probe.
This kind of gaming was untenable to the Federal Circuit
which overturned the district court's ruling that it could hear
the case and that the patents were invalid and not infringed.
The Federal Circuit held that neither the district court nor itself had subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judg-
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ment action as there was no "actual controversy."' 183 The court
recited a number of different tests articulated by itself and the
Supreme Court to determine whether an "actual controversy"
existed. Overall, it settled on its own precedents, as informed
by Supreme Court cases on the matter, that decisions must be
made on the totality of the circumstances with the following as
guidelines:
There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action
by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on
the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face
an infringement suit, and (2) present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to
18
conduct such activity.

4

The question remained after Gen-Probe whether the Federal Circuit's willingness to block licensee challenges to patents based on doctrines such as res judicata, collateral estoppel, and, now, absence of a justiciable case or controversy,
were really just smoke screens for that court's desire to reinstate licensee estoppel in total or in part. I am concerned that
the focus frequently seems to be whether a doctrine is strong
enough to be applied in essentially a bright line fashion, and,
if not, then perhaps it should be chucked into the dustbins of
history. Instead, I think that what are essentially equitable doctrines such as licensee estoppel must be applied in the extraordinary, discretionary way that cases in equity should always be treated, i.e., look to the specific equities of the parties
and decide what will be most just in that case. 185 Regardless,
we will now turn to the MedImmune decision as the Supreme
Court's now definitive pronouncement of this whole area of
law.
183. Id. at 1379-82 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a) for the requirement of "actual controversy").
184. Id. at 1379-80 (quoting BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4
F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). See also EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d
807 (Fed. Cir. 1996); BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
185. In Ebay Inc. v. MercExhange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), the Supreme Court held that rather than grant an injunction as almost a matter of
right for patent owners who succeeded in showing infringement, courts
must apply a four-factor test to weigh the equities - including that of the
public interest - before deciding to grant such an injunction.
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III.
BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE: THE ASYMMETRY OF LITIGATION
OPTIONS AFTER MEDIMMUNE

A.

The MedImmune Decision

Genentech and City of Hope co-owned U.S. Patent No.
4,816,567 (Cabilly I), directed to the use of cell cultures to
manufacture human antibodies. 18 6 The application for
Cabilly I was filed on April 8, 1983 and led to both that patent
and a continuation application filing on June 10, 1988 that
would ultimately issue as U.S. Patent No. 6,331,415 (Cabilly
II).187 However, long before the latter issued, it was the subject of an interference proceeding' 8 8 with U.S. Patent No.
4,816,397 (Boss), owned by Celltech R & D, Ltd., with a British
priority date of March 25, 1983.189 Seven and a half years
later, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI)
decided priority in favor of Boss (and ultimately then
Celltech). 1 90 Genentech then brought a civil action in district
court to challenge or overturn the BPAI's ruling.' 9 1 Based on
the complexity of the issues and technology, the district court
urged Genentech and Celltech to mediate the dispute, which
they did.19 2 A retired judge acted as mediator and the parties
entered into a settlement agreement in which both parties
agreed that the Cabilly II application had priority as against
Boss, based on new evidence involving a draft patent application.193 "Genentech and Celltech also entered into a cross-li186. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed Cir.

2005). The ownership is referred to as by assignment on the part of both
Genentech and City of Hope likely because the patent arose from collaborative research between Genentech and City of Hope and was assigned by the
inventors/employees/researchers of one or both entities to the public-pri-

vate partnership. See MedImmune, Inc. v.Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764,
767-68 (2007).
187. MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 961.
188. Interference proceedings are declared by the USPTO to determine
priority of invention, and hence which, if either, of two patents or applications is valid. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2000) (establishing rules for interference
proceedings in USPTO).
189. MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 961.
190. Id. (citing Cabilly v. Boss, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1988)).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 962.

193. Id.
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cense agreement that included a formula for sharing royalties."' 194 The district court accepted the parties' settlement, entered judgment as to the priority of the Cabilly II application,
and ordered the USPTO to vacate its decision, revoke Boss,
and issue a patent on the Cabilly II application. 195 After some
further delay and issues through no fault of Genentech,
Cabilly II was finally issued by the USPTO on December 18,
2001.
In the meantime, MedImmune, Inc. had taken a license
in 1997 from Genentech for what must have been the family of
patents that issued or might issue from the original Cabilly I
application, thus including Cabilly II once it issued. 19 6 Apparently hedging its bets, MedImmune had also taken a license to
Boss from Celltech in 1998. MedImmune, Inc. manufactures
Synagis, a drug used to prevent respiratory tract disease in infants and young children. 19 7 After the issuance of Cabilly II,
Genentech notified MedImmune that Synagis was covered by
the claims of the newly issued patent, and thus subject to royalties under the 1997 license agreement, to begin in March
2002.198 MedImmune objected, believing that Cabilly II was
invalid and unenforceable, and that in any event Synagis did
not infringe the patent's claims.1 99 Similar to Gen-Probe's actions in Gen-Probe,MedImmune decided to both pay the royalties to avoid an infringement suit from Genentech and to
bring a declaratory judgment action to challenge Cabilly 11.200
The district court granted Genentech's motion to dismiss on
the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of
the Federal Circuit's decision in Gen-Probe.20

1

MedImmune ap-

194. Id.
195. Id. (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Celltech R & D, Ltd., No. 3:98cv03929
(N.D. Cal. March 16, 2001)).
196. Id.
197. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 767 (2007).
198. Id. at 768. Assumedly, neither Cabilly I nor any patent arising from
its application other than Cabilly II actually covered Synagis, and Medlmmune had not heretofore been paying any royalties on sales of the product
to Genentech. It is unclear from both the Federal Circuit and Supreme
Court opinions whether MedImmune had any other products covered by
Cabilly I or other patents in its family, such as Cabilly II.
199. Id; Medlmmune, 427 F.3d at 962.
200. Medlmmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768; Medlmmune, 427 F.3d at 962.
201. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., CV 03-2567 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26,
2004). See Medlmmune, 127 S. Ct. 776-77; Medlmmune, 427 F.3d at 961-62.
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pealed the decision to the Federal Circuit which, unsurprisingly, affirmed it against MedImmune's argument that GenProbe improperly resurrected the doctrine of licensee estoppel
202
abolished by Lear.
MedImmune further appealed and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. The majority opinion, written by Justice
Scalia, asserted that the Court was considering both a freestanding claim of patent invalidity and a contract dispute over
whether the patent was invalid or non-infringed and hence
20 3
whether royalties were owed under the license agreement.
In dissent, Justice Thomas disagreed by asserting that the
Court should only consider the freestanding claim of invalidity
and not reach the contract claim.2 0 4 The majority believed
that this distinction likely did not affect the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction at any rate. 20 5 However, this may have
been too much of a gloss: live contract disputes have been paradigmatic examples of "actual controversies" under the Declaratory Judgment Act since soon after it was passed; patent validity questions have not. Accordingly, once this "threshold" issue has been decided, it may well have decided the case.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to see yet another formulation of the debate over whether a license dispute is at essence
a matter of patent law or contract law, or whether that perhaps
depends on exactly what is being disputed: the validity of a
patent in and of itself; the existence of a valid contract; or the
interpretation of what is considered by the parties to be a valid
contract. To put a point on it though, this debate, which
seems to take on almost metaphysical or scholastic dimensions
at times, brings two contrasting intuitions into play. From the
first perspective, one might say that licenses which have a variation of the standard clause "royalties are to be paid until such
time as the patent is held invalid or unenforceable" mean that
a licensee can frame a contract dispute over whether the underlying patent is currently valid and enforceable. From the
second perspective, one can say that patent validity and enforceability are patent law questions that have nothing to do
with interpreting contract terms but rather patent terms and
202.
203.
204.
205.

MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 961.
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768-70.
Id. at 769; id. at 777-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 777.
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claims. The contract interpretation perspective might argue
that even if this is true, a finding of patent invalidity or unenforceability goes to the basis of the license contract bargain
and thus becomes a contract dispute again. Yet, few license
agreements that I am aware of represent or warrant the validity
or enforceability of the patent; rather at most they only represent that the licensor is the owner of the issued patent, or
has rights under it, and has no reason to believe that it is invalid or unenforceable. 20

6

This would be especially true in li-

censes that grant rights to patent applications, continuations,
reissues, etc. as was the case in the Genentech-MedImmune
license. Where a patent has not even yet issued, ipso facto the
owner of the application cannot represent or warrant its validity of enforceability. Thus, the basis of the license bargain is
the covenant not to sue made by the patent (application)
owner, in exchange for payment by the licensee. This payment, however, is often measured in terms of royalties tied to
sales of licensed products. Therefore, whether a product of
the licensee is a "licensed product," i.e., covered by the claims
of the licensed patents, can be a point of contract dispute. In
other words, questions of whether a particular licensee product would infringe the patent but for the license, and hence
fall within the standard clauses defining "licensed products,"
are as much contract term disputes (where the scope of patent
is a contract term) as patent disputes (claim interpretation).
In sum, the validity or enforceability of a patent is a matter
external to the contract, as the basis of the license contract
bargain is, again, merely the covenant not to sue by the licensor on whatever rights she may have on the defined patents. It
may be that the patents are invalid or unenforceable - and
most contemporary licenses (including that at issue in MedImmune) contain language terminating the licensee's royalty obligations at such time as the underlying patents are finally adjudicated to be invalid or unenforceable - but until that fact is
established by a judicial proceeding, the licensee is paying for
the licensor to refrain from exercising his legal rights to sue
the licensee based on the patents at issue. 20 7 So there is simply

206. See, e.g., NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 125-28, 211-12.
207. Recall that patents are presumed valid by patent law until they are
invalidated. See infra p. 42.
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no contract dispute where the licensee merely "believes" that
2 8
the patents are invalid or unenforceable. 11

Regardless of the issues raised in the foregoing, the Court
only reiterated the rule in Lear- repudiating licensees do not
have to comply with the license, no matter what its terms provide, and pay royalties while challenging the underlying patent. 20

9

Interestingly, the Court asserted that: "We express no

opinion on whether a nonrepudiating licensee is similarly relieved of its contract obligation during a successful challenge
to a patent's validity - that is, on the applicability of licensee
estoppel under these circumstances.

' 21 0

This is fascinating be-

cause the Lear Court did seem to have been trying to eliminate
licensee estoppel in all of its forms. In fact, MedImmune expressly relied on this position in its arguments before the Federal Circuit. 2 11 In the end, the MedImmune Court did accept
MedImmune's first odd conflated claim that it had a contract
claim because it "'disputes its obligation to make payments
under the 1997 License Agreement because [its] sale of its
Synagis product does not infringe any valid claim of [Cabilly
II]."212 By couching the contract dispute in the proper ques-

tion of infringement as discussed above, MedImmune made
this sound like a contract term dispute. However, it was really
arguing that part or all of the claims of Cabilly II were invalid,
which should not have been interpreted as a contract dispute,
but rather as a dispute over things external to the license
agreement, i.e., patent law disputes. Questions of infringe208. Note that all of this tracks the very different, but somewhat analogous, distinctions in assignor estoppel cases, where the equities have been
held to prevent the assignor who later markets an infringing product from
raising a defense of invalidity or unenforceability of the patent. In the assignor estoppel cases, courts held that the assignor could not sell something
for value (land or a patent) and then turn around and deny valid title to that
thing after the sale. Thus, courts have held that the assignor can contest
whether his products in fact infringe the assigned patents, but not whether
the patents are valid or enforceable. In the licensee case, the equities are
very different as the licensee is not selling anything. However, the licensee is
getting the benefit of the basis of the bargain so long as the licensor refrains
from suing him for infringement based on the licensed patents and so there
is no contract dispute over the validity or enforceability of the patents.
209. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 769.
210. Id. at 769-70.
211. See MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 962-63.
212. Medlmmune, 127 S. Ct. at 769 (emphasis added).
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ment and questions of validity are two separate inquiries. The
issue here should simply have been whether Synagis infringed
any claims of Cabilly II on their face, presuming, as we must
under the patent law, that they were valid. In the record, it
appears that Synagis was indeed covered by the claims of
Cabilly II as a prima facie matter. 2 13 The Court accepted
MedImmune's equally weak bootstrapping argument that it
had a contract dispute because even though the 1997 License
Agreement clearly established that royalties must be paid until
the patents were held invalid by a competent body, Medlimmune was relying on the Lear Court's disregard of a similar
requirement in that case and so MedImmune could argue to
Genentech that it did not need to pay royalties - and hence
had created a contract dispute - because the Supreme Court
might also release it from this clear contractual duty (despite,
of course, rulings to the contrary in the case of nonrepudiating licensees by the Federal Circuit).2 14 The Court seems to
be saying that a party can claim that the term "black" in a contract means "white," or "day" means "night," and, without any
meaningful external support for these assertions, claim that it
has raised a valid contract dispute.
Once the Court decided the "threshold" issue and found
a live contract dispute (and perhaps a freestanding patent
claim to boot), it moved on to decide whether MedImmune,
as a licensee in good standing, had demonstrated enough of
an actual controversy to bring its declaratory judgment action
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.The
Court restated its own summary from an earlier case: "'Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged,
under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.'- 2 15 It analyzed the issue as "but for"
the payment of royalties, MedImmune would be under a real
threat of immediate suit that would easily satisfy the criteria for
a declaratory judgment action. Further, even though MedIm213. Brief of Respondent Genentech, Inc. at 4, MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (Sep. 15, 2004) (03-CV-2567).
214. Medlmmune, 127 S. Ct. at 770.
215. Id. at 771 (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co.,
312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
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mune thus had it within its power to prevent any legal harm
from befalling it, the Court asked whether this was enough to
keep the situation from being considered a case or controversy.
The Court's analysis began with consideration of the situation where an individual can bring a declaratory judgment action against the state to challenge a law or its interpretation
without violating that law first.2

16

The justification was said to

be because the citizen's compliance with the law was coerced
on pain of criminal legal actions. This made the situation adversarial even though the government could not in fact take
any action so long as the citizen kept complying with the law.
While acknowledging that this kind of declaratory judgment
action in the absence of any immediately actionable claim by
the declaratory judgment defendant was rare when the government was not a party, the Court was able to come up with a few
examples. 21 7 Disappointingly, though, the Court used Altvater
as its model for deciding the instant case, misrepresenting it a
bit along the way. It turned Altvater from a reasonable case
that only held that courts must decide even declaratory judgment raised as counterclaims to a valid infringement lawsuit
brought by the patent owner into an oversimplified holding that "a

licensee's failure to cease its payment of royalties did not
render nonjusticiable a dispute over the validity of the patent."218 The Court did mention that the validity challenge was
part of a counterclaim, and that licensees were paying royalties
under protest due to an earlier injunction, but in doing so
oversimplified and obscured the important connections and
circumstances in the case.
As I analyzed Altvater earlier in this Article, I noted that it
was critical to understand that: a) the injunction issued because Freeman successfully sued Altvater for producing infringing machines disallowed by their license agreement; b)
Freeman's patent was largely invalidated in a suit with a third
party after the suit with Altvater and so had to be reissued with
markedly different claims from the original that Freeman had
licensed and sued Altvater under; and c) Altvater continued
marketing possibly different machines that Freeman believed
216. See id. at 772-73.
217. See id. at 773.
218. Id.
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infringed his reissued patent that presumably would have required additional royalty payments and/or a new injunction
and so Freeman sued Altvater a second time. It is in the second lawsuit that Altvater raises the counterclaims as to not
only invalidity and non-infringement, but also de facto termination of the original license once Freeman's original patent
was largely invalidated and reissued and the absence or failure
of a new one to take its place. It was to this last point that
Altvater specifically looked for a declaratory judgment: He did
not want it to look like his past practice of continuing to pay
royalties indicated his acquiescence to either a continuation of
the original license after the underlying patent had been
largely invalidated, or to an implied or quasi contract newly
arising on the basis of the reissued patent. Thus, at core, his
defense to the new suit was not that the terms within the license contract were disputed, but rather that he disputed that
the license contract was even still in force (or a new one had
taken its place). To make that defense stick though, he had to
explain why he continued paying royalties that prima facie
made it look as if he believed a license contract was still in
place. His explanation, then, was that until and unless he
could get the injunction lifted from the original suit, he had to
continue paying royalties arisingfrom the original infinging machines covered by thatfirst suit, else be liable for the treble dam-

ages of willful infringement under patent law because he had
been adjudged as infringing a valid patent with those machines in the first suit. Therefore, Altvater was essentially arguing that things were very different after Freeman's original patent was largely invalidated and reissued and that he should not
have to continue laboring under what was now a manifestly
unfair injunction from the first suit. Accordingly, while the
original court prevented Altvater from challenging the original patent in the first suit due to licensee estoppel, 2 19 the court
in the second case allowed many counterclaims and affirmative defenses, including a challenge to the reissued patent, because

there could be no licensee estoppel in the absence of a valid
license agreement. I would reiterate, from my discussion of
the licensee estoppel cases above, that courts are most susceptible to arguments to set aside or ignore license contracts or
specific provisions thereof when something material has
219. This is of course long before Lear largely abolished licensee estoppel.
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changed in the background circumstances of the parties' license relationship. In Altvater something big did indeed
change: Freeman's patent was largely invalidated and a very
different set of substantially narrowed claims emerged in the
reissue.
Finally, the declaratory judgment issue on appeal to the
Supreme Court in Altvater was based on a partial reversal of
the district court's ruling by the Eighth Circuit. The latter
found that once the district court found the original license
terminated (without a replacement) and there was no infringement under the reissued patents, the case or controversy
had been resolved and so Altvater's other counterclaims in the
form of declaratory judgment requests were mooted - e.g., a
finding of invalidity for the reissued patent - and should not
have been granted by the district court. The Supreme Court
believed that the Eighth Circuit had misinterpreted an earlier
Supreme Court case that rebuffed a lower court for finding a
patent was not infringed but still valid, 220 to mean that courts
should not issue holdings broader than the specific issues
raised by the plaintiff The Altvater Court clarified the earlier
holding by stating that it simply meant that courts should not
stray beyond the actual issues raised by either party to the suit
- so not just the plaintiff's claims, but also for example any
counter- or cross-claims of the defendant. In the facts under
Altvater, of course, Altvater had raised a number of counterclaims which then were properly adjudged in a decree by the
district court and improperly removed from that decree by the
Eighth Circuit.
Nonetheless, the Altvater Court desired to retain the guidance that courts not stray outside of their Article III jurisdiction by deciding questions where there was no case or controversy such as by issuing rulings on questions beyond those
needed to adjudicate the dispute at hand. This led to the citation from ElectricalFittings Corp.22 1 that was then bandied about

(and largely misunderstood) between the majority and dissent
in MedImmun. " [T] o hold a patent valid if it is not infringed is
to decide a hypothetical case. '222 As I discussed the quote
220. See supra Part 11(A).
221. See supra pp. 10-13.

222. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 773 n.10; id. at 778, 780 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (quoting Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943)).
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above, 223 it revolved around the distinction that because a patent owner must assert that its patent is valid (although this is
presumed under the patent laws) and infringed, a patent infringement defendant need therefore only show that the patent is invalid or not infringed. In the case at issue, the lower
court had dismissed the original bill on grounds of non-infringement of the patent and then went on to more or less gratuitously hold that the patent was valid. The ElectricalFittings
Corp. Court stated that the non-infringement finding settled
the matter and so there was no live case or controversy left to
decide and so the validity question was mooted. Contrast this
with the facts in Altvater, where Altvater had specifically raised
a challenge to validity as a counterclaim. Thus, the Altvater
Court distinguished the instant facts from those in ElectricalFittings Corp. because Altvater had properly made the validity
question one that was part of the live case or controversy and
thus needed to be adjudicated.
Under the facts in MedImmune, though, there were no judicial findings of validity and infringement of Cabilly II by
MedImmune through its Synagis product. Accordingly, it was
entirely speculative as to whether a court in a hypothetical future infringement suit brought by Genentech (and of course
only on the further speculation that MedImmune stopped paying royalties someday thus opening the door for such suit)
would find that both Cabilly II was valid and infringed by
MedImmune through Synagis and that MedImmune's infringement was willful and hence liable for treble damages. It
is critical to note that if that later court does not find willfulness, then it will likely only award damages that will roughly
equal the reasonable royalties that would have been paid by
MedImmune, plus interest and perhaps some other costs to
make Genentech whole. This should not destroy Medlmmune, especially as it was on notice that Synagis may infringe
Cabilly II and so should have been laying up a cash reserve for
potential litigation on this point. It is true that the hypothetical future court might find MedImmune to have willfully infringed Cabilly II - and certainly MedImmune's demonstrable
knowledge of Cabilly II can help this finding - but this is far
less certain, and thus far less of a "coercive" risk, than the likelihood that Altvater would have been found to have willfully
223. See supra note 57.
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infringed Freeman's original patent after a court had already
in fact found Altvater's products to have infringed Freeman's
(then) valid patent and issued an injunction addressing the
same.
The foregoing leads to the heart of the disruption that
the MedImmune decision throws into the licensing community:
any party that knows of any patent that may cover its products
knows that it is possible that a court could ultimately find it to
have willfully infringed the patent and award treble damages
to the patent owner; MedImmune appears to find that should
that party decide to take a license to the patent instead, it will
have been "coerced" into doing so and should then be seen to
have an ongoing live case and controversy with the patent
owner allowing it to bring a declaratory judgment action
whenever it chooses. Where does this end? Does it matter if
the prospective licensee discovered the existence of the patent
on its own and approached the patent owner to request a license? Are there not times when organizations or individuals
should have the courage of their (patent attorney's) convictions and simply not take a license when they believe that their
products are not infringing or that the patent is not valid? Patent litigation may be "the sport of kings" due to is expense,
and that may tip the balance for some individuals and organizations who might otherwise tell a patent owner to pound sand
when given notice of a patent, but the policy issue is to address
the cost of patent litigation, not to introduce the fiction that
licensees were "coerced" into taking the license and paying the
royalties "under protest" for purposes of allowing random declaratory judgment actions brought by licensees in good standing who cannot be sued by their licensors.
Further, where is the contract dispute in all of this that is
supposed to be at the heart of actions under the Declaratory
Judgment Act? There was a patent that your product may infringe, you took a license to hedge your bets (or even, honestly, because you knew that your product does infringe the patent), and now you are paying the royalties prescribed under
the patent. What has changed or needs to be interpreted? In
Altvater, something very big did change: the patent was largely
invalidated and then reissued. By contrast, in MedImmune
the only real change is that Cabilly II finally issued. However,
MedImmune always knew the potential scope of Cabilly II's
claims, as well as the even wider potential scope of all claims
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that might ultimately issue from the application for Cabilly I
(including Cabilly II of course), and chose to take a license to
the whole invention space marked out by this original application, explicitly including continuations, reissues, etc. Thus,
how can it be a changed circumstance when a part of this invention space eventually does issue in a patent? It is true that
MedImmune may well have started speculating that Cabilly II
would never issue based on its conflict with Boss, and the long
period of the interference may have helped this growing speculation, but it should have known better than to rule out a
patent application until it is finally and decisively rejected (and
such rejection affirmed by whatever appeals may follow). That
it was wrong in its speculation over this does not magically generate a contract dispute over a license agreement that specifically included obligations on its part to pay royalties on any of
its products that come within the scope of claims included in
any patents issued under the original Cabilly I application as
described above.
At best, MedImmune can argue that there is a contract
dispute over whether Synagis in fact infringes or comes within
the issued claims of Cabilly II. That would properly amount to
a disagreement over terms of the contract (in this case the patent claims of Cabilly II would be the terms to be interpreted).
MedImmune does not have a contract dispute over whether
Cabilly II is valid, however, because there is simply no arguinentation space around the fact that Cabilly II was issued as a
continuation of the Cabilly I application. Therefore there is no
need for an "interpretation" of a contract term that would
have to read something like "licensee will pay royalties on
products that would otherwise infringe a validly issued patent
stemming from the Cabilly I application." If the latter provision were in the license agreement, then MedImmune could
argue that there is a need for a court to interpret whether
Cabilly II is "validly issued." There is no such provision, however, and at any rate such a provision might be seen as in some
tension with the presumed validity of patents issued by the
USPTO under patent law. Instead, the license at issue in
MedImmune requires royalties for any products that would
otherwise infringe any patents issued under the Cabilly I application, as described above, until the patent or claim under
which the infringement arises is held invalid by a competent
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If such an event arguably comes to pass and Medlmmune and Genentech cannot agree, in good faith, 225 about
whether the patent or a claim has been invalidated in this
manner, then that might perhaps be a scenario in which a declaratory judgment action by MedImmune might be proper.
The problem in the actual facts of the case is that I think
MedImmune knew that it would not be able to show that
Synagis was not infringing, in the sense of coming within, the
issued claims of Cabilly I1,226 but might have a better than even
chance of successfully arguing the validity of Cabilly II based
on the ample fodder for such an argument provided by the
tortured prosecution and interference history of that patent.
Understanding that it has a better contract dispute argument a better avenue to justify a declaratory judgment action than a
freestanding patent invalidity claim - by arguing a conflict
over whether Synagis actually infringes Cabilly II, but realizing
that Synagis likely will be seen as coming within the claims of
Cabilly II as issued, MedImmune had little choice but to try
and bamboozle the Court by hiding a validity challenge within
an infringement challenge, i.e., "Synagis does not infringe
Cabilly 1I because Cabilly I is invalid." The Court should have
seen through this subterfuge and affirmed the Federal Circuit's ruling.
Only one major matter remained for the MedImmune
Court, which was whether even if the contract dispute theory
as described above was faulty, MedImmune should still have
standing for its declaratory judgment action simply because it
wanted to contest the validity of patent and was not precluded
from doing so in any provision of the license agreement itself.
As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that licensing practitioners generally believe that no-contest provisions in license
agreements are unenforceable, I believe stemming from the
22 7
rejection of just such as clause as manifestly unjust in Pope.
224. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 769.
225. I remain extremely concerned about bootstrapped "contract disputes" arising from nothing more than silly or even bad faith attempts to
generate conflict over terms or their application primarily to allow a declaratory judgment action, which of course results in some significant procedural
advantages for the declaratory judgment plaintiff.
226. There is some suggestion of this in the briefs. See Brief of Respondent Genentech, Inc., supra note 213, at 4.
227. See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
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So to penalize licensors for not including something in a license agreement that they really cannot include because it is
likely unenforceable as against public policy is a little odd.
More importantly, the MedImmune Court refused to opine on
whether the Federal Circuit's rulings that Lear only abolishes
licensee estoppel for repudiating licensees makes it very difficult for the Court to do what it really wanted to do, which was
to find that MedImmune would have standing for a declaratory judgment action solely on the basis of a freestanding, noncontract based claim of patent invalidity. Yet, it nowhere
clearly said this and thus I do not believe its holding contains
this proposition. Instead, the Court had to keep returning to
the contract dispute rationales (as I believe it must for purposes of satisfying the requirements of the Declaratory Judgment Act). It rejected Genentech's appeal to the common law
rule that a party to a contract cannot at one and the same time
challenge its validity and continue to reap its benefits, 2 28 by
responding that "[MedImmune] is not repudiating or im22 9
pugning the contract while continuing to reap its benefits."

But of course, this is exactly what MedImmune is trying to do
indirectly because it cannot do it directly: the net result will be
that MedImmune will be able to disregard payments that
would have been owed under the license agreement had it
been forced to comply with the Federal Circuit's still untouched licensee estoppel rule for licensees in good standing.
The Supreme Court itself has ruled against technical tricks
that allows parties to achieve indirectly what they are prohibited from doing directly, as I described in the assignor estoppel cases above. 2 30 So why is it going to allow MedImmune to
do that here? More importantly, if the Supreme Court does
not like the Federal Circuit's rule limiting licensee estoppel to
non-repudiating licensees in the wake of Lear, then it should
have directly overturned this rule, rather than refusing to
opine on the matter. As a matter of clarity in the law, the state
of the law after MedImmune is not good: non-repudiating licensees may or may not be able to bring freestanding challenges
to patent validity upon no trigger other than their own whim;
228. See Brief of Respondent Genentech, Inc., supranote 213, at 16 (for an
overview of Genentech's argument).
229. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 776.
230. See supra Part II.
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any licensee is free to bring a declaratory judgment action at
any time based on any manufactured "contract dispute" so
long as they can argue that they are not happy to pay royalties
and thus were "coerced" into doing so; and, in any event, patent validity challenges can be disguised as scope of infringement disputes and thus contract disputes.
B.

Problemsfor Licensors in the Wake of MedImmune

Alas, MedImmune is what it is, and until or unless Congress
23 1
passes a constitutionally sound law modifying the outcome,
the licensing community must now strategize to find legal avenues to advance and protect their clients' interests. The next
Part of this Article will outline my proposal for a particular,
but very important, niche of the licensing field that is most
affected by MedImmune. Before turning to that, however, I
want to briefly summarize where that decision has left us.
MedImmune holds that a licensee in good standing is not
required to break or terminate (repudiate) its license before
seeking a declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying patent is invalid. 232 While not expressly opining on
the validity of the Federal Circuit's rule in Gen-Probe- i.e., that
a non-repudiating licensee is estopped from challenging the
underlying patent - the MedImmune Court seems to disfavor

such a rule as it does not see any reason why the licensee is
simultaneously getting the benefit of its license and challenging it at the same time by "simply" contesting the validity of the
underlying patent. This of course ignores the favorable market position that the licensee is receiving under the license.
The Court also seems to be willing to consider even fairly farfetched, self-serving claims of "contract disputes" by a licensee
in order to bring a declaratory judgment action. To be fair,
the Court is not opining about the merits of the MedImmuneGenentech dispute, nor licensee challenge cases generally. It
is only deciding whether such declaratory judgment actions
must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Further, the Court does not bar Genentech's argument that
231. Given the sentiments expressed in the last session of Congress and
that anticipated for the current session, any hope of patent reform would
most likely be directed against owner's rights and powers rather than overturning the MedImmune decision.
232. Medlmmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777.
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courts are not required to hear declaratory judgment actions
even if a party makes out a prima facie case, but leaves this for
the lower courts to decide.
Returning to the license taxonomy from Part II above, I
will now review how the different types of licenses, and their
parties, are affected by MedImmune. First, settlement licenses,
broadly construed, may be injeopardy. For the subcategory of
judicially imposed or recognized settlement licenses (i.e. entered into the record of a dispute as part of its adjudication or
resolution), it is an open question whether the Federal Circuit's res judicata approach will continue to prevail, or
whether the Supreme Court's apparent view that government
"coerced" royalty payments made "under protest" give rise to a
sufficient actual controversy ripe for a declaratory judgment
action on the validity of the underlying patents. Hopefully,
the Supreme Court will ultimately follow Altvater and require a
significant changed circumstance, such as invalidated patents
or claims from other proceedings, before allowing declaratory
judgment actions at any time. If it does not so limit them,
then patent owners can expect that so long as their patents
have not been finally adjudicated as valid (and the defendant's
products infringing), then the settlement may not "stick" but
rather be susceptible to attack in a subsequent declaratory
judgment action. The subcategory of settlement licenses arising from private enforcement or monitoring efforts will likely
be even more susceptible to declaratory judgment actions as
there will be little argument of resjudicata availing to the patent owner. Further, as the courts have been willing to broadly
interpret the imminent threat of suit standard to include even
patent notice letters that are not in the form of a cease-anddesist, targets of such enforcement or monitoring efforts will
likely have wide leeway to choose the timing of a declaratory
judgment action: anytime from receipt of the original letter or
contact until years into any license resulting from the ensuing
discussion, including before or after royalty payments have
started.
Second, deal licenses may fare even worse. At its most elemental, the rule emerging from MedImmune seems to be that
non-repudiating licensees, no matter what the origins or impetus of the license agreement, can seek a declaratory judgment
in federal court at any time to find that the underlying patent
is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Under the Court's
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broad interpretation of what it means to be "coerced," all
licensees can argue that they did not enter the license and pay
royalties with pleasure, but rather because there was some explicit or implicit threat of private legal action by the patent
holder lurking behind even the most "voluntary" deal. I wonder whether the Court will even find coercion where a prospective licensee approaches a patent owner out of the blue
because it wants to license the owner's patent to start a new
business or product line? Notwithstanding any possible coercion in the origins of the license, the MedImmune Court seems
to find coercion even later in the license relationship where a
voluntary licensee, perhaps even one as described in the preceding scenario, decides that it now believes the underlying
patent to be invalid or not to have covered his product at all;
but when the licensor does not agree to release him from all
harm and not enforce the patent, the licensee decides to continue paying the royalties, only now "under protest." Never
mind whether the licensee undertook due diligence in examining the patents and considering the nature of his products
before entering into the license. So, coercion and contract
disputes can now arise in any kind of deal license and at any
time. And, even more so than settlement licenses arising from
private enforcement activities, deal licenses will have none of
the possible protection of res judicata.
All of this brings us down to the real issue for patentee/
licensors: will they receive fair compensation for their licenses?
Essentially, after Medlmmune, this breaks down into three different time frames. Working in reverse chronological order,
the post-adjudication period is potentially a win big, lose big
period. At this point, either: (i) the patents have been held
invalidated, unenforceable, or non-infringed and, from the
case law, we know that no matter what the license contract
says, the licensee will not be obliged to pay anything else; or
(ii) the patents will have been held valid, enforceable, and infringed, and the licensor can expect to receive full royalty payments (plus possibly treble damages if the licensee repudiated
and did not have reasonable justification for its position), although it might have to resort to further judicial proceedings
to actually extricate the money from the licensor. Further, the
licensor has a "certified" patent now that, barring newly produced prior art, should command higher license fees and royalties in the marketplace, as well as discourage other of its
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licensees (or prospective licensees) from challenging the patent. In the extreme, one might imagine a licensor structuring
a license to require only a "discounted" royalty rate for unchallenged patents, but then increasing that rate after successfully
defending the validity of her patent, whether from a challenge
by a third party or the licensee itself.
The second time frame is the pre-adjudication, but postchallenge period, by which I mean the time after a declaratory
judgment action or other legal challenge was filed but before
the final ruling in that (or any similar) proceeding. This period may present the most unexpected risk for the licensor, as
she may be under the false belief that she can still demand
royalties during the proceeding and up until its conclusion.
However, we know from the case law that repudiating licensees
are not liable for payments during this period (unless the patent is finally validated and infringement found). Non-repudiating licensees who now have the ability to challenge the patent at essentially any time may be deemed to fall under the
same rules as repudiating licensees, because the test seemed to
be when/whether the licensee had registered its challenge to
the patents. So, it may be that no licensees are liable for royalties from the time when they take action on their patent challenge, in whichever recognized form they use - unless, of
course, their challenge is ultimately unsuccessful.
The third time frame runs from the execution of the license until any challenge is mounted. In theory, it should be
the most certain period for payment of expected royalties to
the licensor, but in a number of cases the expected royalties
for this period may turn out to be none. Why? Because in
many license arrangements - mainly deal licenses - the licen-

see took the license before it either developed a product or was
ready to start distributing it. Thus, whether royalties are calculated based on units sold or net sales receipts, no royalties are
owed if no products are being sold. 23 3 It is precisely when the

licensee begins to sell units and realize revenues that the patent challenge is likely to occur. Quite possibly then, a licensor
could find itself having incurred the opportunity cost of granting an exclusive license to a company to commercialize the
233. Sometimes licensors will use "minimum royalty" requirements that
require a licensee to pay some floor level of royalties regardless of units sold
just to keep the license. NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 116.
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licensor's patent - meaning it is placing all of its patent profitability bets on one licensee - and then have the licensee challenge the patent just when the licensee has developed a product under the legal safety of the license. 234 The opportunity
cost is higher than you might think as well. It is not only that
the patentee could have had someone else trying to commercialize its patent in the time it was exclusively licensed to the
now dead beat licensee, but also that very few companies may
be willing to take a license from the patentee after all that time
has passed and there is a taint to the patent. Certainly, an active patent challenge in court is going to severely depress the
market value of the patent to prospective licensees. But those
companies may also wonder whether the original licensee has
now developed some other enhancement or other protectable
IP that will be asserted against the new licensee. Finally, in the
high tech world, the window may simply be closing for the patented technology by the time all of this has run its course.
In the end, the MedImmune position is maddening for patentee/licensors because it creates a primarily one way path for
litigation - from licensee as plaintiff in a declaratory judgment
action. Because the licensee has not repudiated the agreement, the licensor is blocked from suing the licensee by its
own covenant not to sue at the heart of the license. This is like
blocking a landlord from evicting a tenant who is trying to
burn down the apartment house to collect renters insurance.
It is true that the licensor does not have to be caught completely flat footed. It can, for example, include a termination
clause in its licenses that allows it to terminate the license
upon any challenge of the patent by the licensee. 235 At least
this ameliorates the one way litigation problem as it would, in
theory, allow the patentee to sue the licensee. In practice,
however, in the wake of MedImmune, licensees will likely not
234. But for the license, the licensee would have been liable to the patentee for infringement and subject to injunctive relief. So, while the measure
of damages will be small during the R&D period (no products sold, no revenue, no reasonable royalties), the real threat to the commercializing party is
the potential for an injunction which will prevent it from proceeding any
further on the project - even if it has already expended its own substantial

R&D outlays.
235. Note that these are not no-contest clauses that would contractually

bar the licensee from challenging the patent - such as were rejected by the
Supreme Court in Pope.
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challenge the patent in any other way than a declaratory judgment action, thus effectively depriving the licensor of any
meaningful opportunity to take control of the litigation as
plaintiff by suing the licensee first. The termination clause
does have the additional benefit of at least depriving the licensee of the coverage of the license if the patent challenge fails.
But this may be of little practical value. The non-exclusive licensor may find all of this somewhat less problematic as it
need not have incurred the same opportunity cost as an exclusive licensor. For the non-exclusive licensor, it may be enough
that it can terminate the license upon a challenge by the licensee and then hope to collect some money from the licensee
later if it succeeds in defending its patent. 2 36 For the exclusive

licensor - especially socially beneficial non-commercializing
patent owners like universities, non-profit research centers
and small inventors - the problems presented by MedImmune

are not so easily handled or taken in stride.
For exclusive licensors like those just mentioned, the
world has been radically changed, and so it is primarily for
them that I propose a solution in the final Part of this Article.
Before doing so it is important to flesh out this niche of licensors that I am most concerned about and whom I believe deserve a better understanding of the equities involved in their
license relationships than that evinced by both the Lear and
MedImmune Courts. As a preliminary matter, whatever one's
concerns about "patent trolls," the coarse definitions of trolls
as any patent owner who does not manufacture his own products is just plain silly. Much core innovation and invention is
achieved by individuals or organizations who are simply not set
up, by design or accident, to commercialize their valuable insights. Universities, for example, are probably the best example of this, but the government itself is a good example too. In
fact, the Bayh-Dole Act was passed in large part to reduce the
amount of innovative research being performed by universities
and others under federal funding that was languishing "on the
236. This is at least the position of Microsoft so far, which now has an
extensive licensing program. Lisa Tanzi et al, Microsoft Counsel, Remarks at
the Licensing Executives Society Luncheon (Jan. 17, 2006) (as noted by author as attendee). Note, however, that the single challenge, if successful,
could bring down the whole set of royalties for the non-exclusive licenses
under that patent. Of course, if the patent is truly invalid then this is the
proper outcome anyway.
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shelf," so to speak, because there was no clear, predictable
mechanism to transfer the research results out to the public
for commercialization. 237 Bayh-Dole gave the funding recipients the right to elect to take the title to any patent arising
from the funded research, so long as the recipient then took
timely affirmative steps to bring the patented invention to
"practical application" - which meant either direct commercialization or licensing it out for commercialization. 238 Universities and non-profits who essentially never directly commercialize their inventions are the main target of Bayh-Dole.
Thus the role of licensing figures prominently in the Act, and
licensing requirements - such as preferences for small businesses as licensees and "substantial manufacture" in the
United States - are scattered throughout the Act. Accordingly, if universities and other non-commercializing non-profits are "trolls" then they are government sponsored trolls.
More importantly, the deal licenses struck between universities and other non-profit research organizations on the
one hand, and private industry on the other, are primarily positive, completely voluntary - indeed socially desirable - "tech

transfer" agreements that incentivize and allow key research
breakthroughs to be transformed into valuable products and
services for public consumption. Without such tech transfer
licenses, arguably much of the life saving new technologies
originating in university labs would never become available to
you or me in the form of safely deliverable medicines or devices administered by health care professionals. Therefore, to
view these licenses as "coerced" and thus undesirable in some
way is to seriously misunderstand the licensing environment
and the manner in which contemporary technology products
and services get to market. Far from being coerced and/or

237. Prior to the passage of Bayh-Dole, many federal funding agencies retained the rights to inventions arising under their funding. Thus, just prior
to the passage of Bayh-Dole these agencies collectively held 28,000 patents,
of which only 4% had ever been developed as a product for use by consumers. Senator Birch Bayh, Statement to the National Institutes of Health (May
25, 2004), available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/Meeting/May25.htm.
238. Pub .L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 200
to 212 (2006)). See also O'Connor, The Use of MTAs, supra note 10; Sean M.
O'Connor, IntellectualPropertyRights and Stem Cell Research: Who Owns the Medical Breakthroughs?, 39 NEw ENG. L. Rv. 665 (2005).
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undesirable, these deals in fact are essential to getting socially
23 9
beneficial research results from bench to bedside.
In part due to Bayh-Dole's preference for licensing to
small businesses, and in part due to the realities of the market
place for licenses of the very early stage technologies that arise
in university and other research settings, many tech transfer
agreements involve small to mid-size entities (SMEs) as licensees. 2 40 These companies rarely have large amounts of cash on
hand and thus rely on the running royalty license structure to
secure tech transfer licenses. 24 1 Further, because of their
often cash-poor situation, they usually need to minimize any
up front license payments to the university or other patent
owner. 2 42 Thus, the university is extending them a kind of
credit - in exchange for the possibility of royalty and perhaps
milestone payments down the road, the university will grant
them a valuable exclusive license now with which they can
safely and exclusively engage in the expensive commercialization R&D to bring products based on the patent to market.
However, the Supreme Court's holding in MedImmune
threatens to seriously upset this standard tech transfer bargain.
It allows the licensee to take the license on "credit" and then
challenge the underlying patent once the licensee has successfully commercialized products under the license and payment
for the "credit" comes due, all without jeopardizing its privileged position under the license vis-A-vis both the university
and the market place. Universities could start including
clauses in their tech transfer licenses that terminate the license
on any such challenge, but this would still not undo the substantial harm based on the lost opportunity cost the university
incurred by committing the patent exclusively to the licensee
for what might have been years of critical R&D. What other
industry party will now take a license to this patent - keeping
239. There are, of course, some criticisms of Bayh-Dole and the tech transfer system it helped to create. However, a discussion of those criticisms, and
the responses to them, is beyond the scope of this paper. For a fuller discussion, see O'Connor, The Use of MTAs, supra note 10; O'Connor, Intellectual
Property Rights, supra note 238.
240. See F. Kinsey Haffner et al., University Technology TransferRights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 203, 262 (Aline C. Flower ed.,
2006).
241. See id. at 256.
242. See id.
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in mind that the patent is now both under challenge (whether
meritorious or not) and the former licensee may be holding
potential new patents or applications that will effectively block
any commercialization path of new licensees?
In summary, throughout this Part of the Article, I have
argued that the MedImmune decision affects licensors across
the spectrum. While I do not agree with much of the Medlmmune holding and opinion, I do acknowledge that bad patents
and malicious, fraudulent, or extortive would-be licensors
should not be allowed to hide behind any kind of bright line
licensee estoppel doctrine or its equivalent. My point is that
licensee estoppel and many of the other license issues debated
in the Lear to MedImmune sequence of cases are equitable doctrines that should be treated as such, i.e., by weighing the equities on a case by case basis, rather than relying on bright line
rules or absolute bars. In other IP cases, such as EBay v.
MercExchange,24 3 the Supreme Court has been making exactly
this point in the face of what appear to be bright line rules and
absolute bars created by the Federal Circuit as the latter exercises its privileged position to hear all federal district court patent appeals. It is unclear why the Supreme Court did not follow this inclination in MedImmune. Nonetheless, my hope is
that the Court will in the future be more inclined to consider
the considerable equities that one niche of licensors - virtuous
non-commercializing innovators such as universities - has for
the kinds of deal licenses that they must rely on to commercialize their valuable and socially useful technologies. In the
meantime, I conclude the Article in the next Part by setting
out in concrete terms a strategy that these kinds of licensors
can deploy to mitigate the bad spot that the MedImmune decision has put them in.
IV.
(RE)BUILDING EQuITY: USE

OF

STOCK AND STOCK OPTIONS TO

SAFELY MIMIC EXPECTED RUNNING ROYALTIES FOR LICENSORS

One easy sounding response to the licensor's problem
created by MedImmune is that licensors must simply demand all
of the expected life time value of the patent license up front.
243. EBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839, 1841
(2006).
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That way, the licensee can do what he wants - challenge or not
challenge - and it's all the same to the licensor. Nothing in
the law prevents a patent owner from collecting one up front
licensing fee. 244 However, upon reflection, this presents a few
hurdles. First, it may be quite hard to determine with any
sense of accuracy the net present value of an expected royalty
stream. In cases where the patent owner always viewed his patent as having some fairly fixed market value, then he might
just as easily decide that this is the upfront license fee. And,
one might expect that patentees who have that kind of valuation in hand already try to either assign or exclusively license
the patent for a single up front payment. However, not all (or
even perhaps many) prospective assignees/licensees have
enough cash on hand to pay this upfront fee, unless the patent's value is fairly low. Thus, based on any combination of
the foregoing, many patent owners have found it best to take
some relatively modest up front fee and then receive the rest
of their compensation in the form of royalties, sometimes tied
to milestones or other events inside or outside the licensee's
organization 245
In truth, this overall package may be based on some ball
park estimate of the total lifetime value of the patent, but the
royalty mechanism allows this rough estimate to be self-correcting, to some degree, over time. The rough estimate of the
overall value of the patent can be used instead as a starting
point to propose what the upfront payment and royalty rate
should be, rather than just picking the numbers out of thin
air. 2 46 Of course, the patent owner has to deal with the reali-

ties of the licensing market. For example, many industries
have fairly standard royalty rate ranges. 24 7 Further, licensees
often undertake their own evaluation of the patents ahead of
the negotiation and use any evidence of weakness (meaning
244. See NGUYEN ET

AL.,

supra note 8, at 113-17. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF

JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995).
245. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 113-17.
246. Although anecdotally I know that a fair bit of that happens as well!
247. In the university and non-profit research tech transfer sector, for example, the archives of listservs such as Techno-L provides an excellent
source of "standard" and actual royalty rates as attested to by tech transfer
staff at major research institutions. Techno-L, http://www.techno-l.org/
(last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
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susceptibility to invalidation) to bargain down the up front
payment and/or royalty rate. In other cases, the patent is on
such an early stage or "upstream" invention that the risks of
successful commercialization are higher and R&D will be
more costly and time consuming to the licensee, so the overall
compensation package is ratcheted down. The reader can follow out this line of thought and consider other ways that prospective licensees can barter down the desired compensation
of the patentee.
The upshot of all of this is that it will often simply not be
feasible for a patentee to receive all of the value of the patent
license up front in cash. 24

8

Additionally, many prospective

licensees may simply be uncomfortable with committing to an
entire non-refundable pay-out at the beginning of the license
term when they do not yet know how many units of the covered product they are actually going to sell or the per unit
price. For the licensor, though, once a substantial portion of
the total expected returns from the licensing deal are pushed
out to royalty payments, then, particularly in the case of noncommercializing patentees who rely on exclusive licenses,
MedImmune poses a huge additional risk to the licensor's expected returns. Thus what is required is a way to essentially
transfer all of the potentialreturns to the patentee at the execution of the license agreement in a way that unlocks the value to
the licensor over time. This should be somehow connected to
the success of the licensed product, but without any material
ability for the licensee to block the unlocking of value over
time through patent challenges, license challenges, or otherwise.
As the reader already knows from the title of this Article
and Part, my proposed solution is to use a combination of
stock and stock options to execute this value transfer. The use
of each will correspond to a different time horizon of opportunity; collectively the package will coarsely mimic the performance related payout that would occur under a royalty scheme,
248. But see Press Release, Emory University, Gilead Sciences and Royalty
Pharma Announce $525 Million Agreement With Emory University To
Purchase Royalty Interest For Emtricitabine (July 18, 2005), available at
http://www.news.emory.edu/Releases/emtri/ (announcing a one time cash

payment of $525M to essentially pay the net present value of the expected
lifetime royalties for Emory's patent on emtricitabine).
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but without the patent challenge and repudiation risk in the
post-MedImmune era. The primary benefit is that all of the
stock and options can be transferred and owned by the licensor immediately upon execution of the license. At the same
time, contingencies can be built into the options, as discussed
below, to provide the value unlocking function over time, tied
to events at the licensee's organization, but not dependent on
separate administrative actions by the licensee to effectuate
the value unlock, and certainly not dependent on permissions
or blocking efforts by the licensee. 24 9 Before considering the
exact mechanism of my proposal, however, it is critical to establish the primary types of securities used by SME high tech
companies and their strengths, limitations, and regulation.
A.

Types of Equity Stakes and Their Implicationsfor Investors

We must first consider the value of stock or other equity
to the licensor as an investor. Like patents, equity stakes have
to be valued somehow since they are not cash equivalents.
Pricing stock and other equities can be simplistic - for a public
traded company, the value of its trading stock is simply the
price it sells for in the open market at any given time - or very
complicated - using methods such as the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model to figure out the dollar value of stock options at a future date. 250 Beyond all of this, however, is an
even more fundamental issue: how does the investor turn
stocks into cash? At some point, essentially all investors or
their heirs will be converting stock into cash because it is overwhelmingly cash that allows us to buy other things (unless you
are a company that can buy another company with nothing
but your own stock). The only real question then is when to
sell.
249. Technically, this last part is not entirely true. When the licensor exercises her options or warrants, she does need to rely on someone at the licen-

see company, such as the corporate secretary, to accept her money (where
applicable) and then issue her the corresponding stock. However, it is prob-

ably safe to assume that a company is not going to start playing around with
dishonoring binding stock options, which could cause other critical investors
to run panicked for the exits.
250. See, e.g., Simon Benninga & Zvi Wiener, Binomial Option Pricing the

Black-Scholes Option PricingFormula, and Exotic Options, MATHEMATICA IN EDuCATIoN & RESEARCH, Vol. 6, No. 4., 1997, at 1, available at http://finance.
wharton.upenn.edu/-benninga/mma/MiER64.pdf.
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Or, to augment that, the only real questions might be
when and how to sell. Most average investors are only buying
publicly traded shares in the secondary capital markets. In
other words, they are not buying shares directly from the company ("issuer" in securities law parlance) ,251 but rather from
other investors who currently hold the issuer's shares in transactions mediated by broker-dealers, 252 usually in a formal market or stock exchange 2 53 such as NASDAQ 25 4 or the New York
Stock Exchange.2 55 These shares in nearly all cases were originally made available for public trading in the secondary markets by the issuer through an initial public offering (IPO) or
subsequent public offering in compliance with the Securities
Act of

1933256

and Regulation C 25 7 promulgated by the SEC

thereunder. Once the shares were initially sold in just such a
primary capital market offering - either direct to investing
members of the public or through underwriters 258 and then to
the public - they then became freely tradable in the secondary
markets. Accordingly, they can be a highly liquid investment
that can be disposed of quickly if necessary. 25 9 However,
shares sold directly to investors not involving a registered public offering under the Securities Act of 1933 and Regulations C
(usually called a "private placement") cannot be resold with251. See 15 U.S.C. §77b(a) (4) (2000) (defining "issuer" under the Securities Act of 1933).
252. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(12) (defining "dealer" under the Securities
Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (5) (2000) (defining "dealer" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
253. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1) (2000) (defining "exchange" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
254. NASDAQ http://www.nasdaq.com (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
255. New York Stock Exchange, http://www.nyse.com (last visited Apr.
23, 2007).
256. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-h (2000) (specifying securities offering require-

ments).
257. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400 to -494 (2006).
258. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (a) (11) (2000) (defining "underwriter" under the
Securities Act of 1933).
259. This is especially true for stock of major publicly traded issuers for
whom there are usually "market makers" - brokers or dealers who make
themselves available to buy and sell the stock of the particular issuer on their
own account (meaning not for customer's accounts, and hence subject to
customer buy or sell orders). See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (38) (2000) (defining
"market maker" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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out registration under the Act or an exemption therefrom. 260
In fact, the original private placement itself must have occurred under one of the exemptions from § 5's registration
requirements26 1 - either because the security belongs to the
class of exempt securities identified under § 3,262 or because
the transactionwas exempt under § 4.263 If the private placement shares were exempt securities under § 3, then they generally have no restrictions on their resale as they are always
exempt from the registration requirements of § 5. However, a
private placement involving shares that are not exempt shares,
and thus was effected through an exempt transaction under
§ 4, results in "restricted stock" that cannot be resold unless
the shares are subsequently made part of a registered offering
under § 5 or the resale itself can be structured to fall under a
transaction exemption under § 4.264
While a full discussion of the nuances of securities law regarding private placements and the resale of restricted stock is
beyond the scope of this Article, the take away point is that
investors who purchase restricted stock often find themselves
with a somewhat illiquid investment, because they cannot simply turn around and sell it at any time through a broker-dealer
as they could do with other publicly traded holdings. Further,
because the categories of exempt securities in § 3 primarily
consist of things such as municipal securities, private placements of regular for profit corporations' stock generally must
be structured as an exempt transaction under § 4,265 and thus
result in restricted shares for the investors. This will be especially relevant for my university and non-profit patent licensors
because a high percentage of SME high tech companies will
be privately held. Accordingly, the stocks of these companies
260. See Regulation D, Rule 502(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2006).

261. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
262. Id. § 77c.
263. Id. § 77d.

264. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).
265. Notable exceptions are Rule 504(b) (1) in Regulation D (but this is
limited to private placements not exceeding $1M in the aggregate), id.
§ 230.504(b) (1), and Regulation A (which requires a "mini-offering" that

may be almost as expensive and time consuming as a regular registered public offering under section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e. See id. §§ 230.251(d), 230.252-

230.253.
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will be far less liquid in the marketplace, and in some cases
there may be no real market for the shares.
Outside of the purely legal restrictions described above,
private placement securities may have other restrictions because they are usually sold as part of a negotiated private placement deal, such as a venture capital financing round, and are
subject to certain contractual. rights and obligations under investor rights agreements or shareholder voting agreements. 2 66
Additionally, much of the private placement equity will be in
the form of preferred stock, which may or may not be convertible into common shares of the issuer, but will almost certainly
have special rights and preferences (as compared to common
stock) as defined in either the issuer's articles of incorporation
or bylaws. 267 While the preferred stock issued by large, established companies may often have some preferential financial
treatment as compared to common stock - perhaps a fixed
dividend - it may also have reduced voting rights 268 This is
often not the case with preferred stock issued by SMEs in the
high tech space: venture capitalists will demand preferred
stock with financial preferences and voting rights equal or superior to those of common stockholders. 269 As to the financial
preferences, the venture capitalists will generally be looking
for liquidation preferences, in which they receive a fixed payout from any assets left upon liquidation or dissolution of the
company before any similar payouts to common stockholders,
2 70
or other subordinate preferred stock series holders.
266. See Edwin L. Miller et al., Venture CapitalFinancingsof Technology Companies, in INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:17 (West 2002).

267. See id. §§ 3:10, 3:17.
268. MICHAEL D. SINGER, THE POCKET MBA, "Preferred Stock" (Practicing
Law Institute, 2003).
269. See generally Miller et al., supra note 266 §§ 3:10-3:17.
270. Id. § 3:11. Note that upon a liquidation, remaining assets must be
distributed first to the government for any taxes or assessments due, second
to creditors, and third to equity holders. Thus, in many cases there will be
no assets left to distribute to any shareholders. But in the event that there
are, then preferred stock holders would like to be senior to other stock holders. See generally id. Issuers are generally free to classify their stock into different classes, with different series within a class if desired. See, e.g., Wash.
Rev. Code § 23B.06.020 (2007). The articles or certificate of incorporation

of the issuer generally may either define the rights and preferences of any
preferred classes or series or may delegate this power to the board of directors. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 23B.06.010, 020 (2007). Classes or series
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A further set of conditions on preferred or common stock
that is not registered for public sale under the securities laws
may appear in the contracts mentioned above - investor rights
agreements and shareholder voting agreements - that often
accompany the core stock purchase agreement at the heart of
the private placement deal as follows. A Right of First Refusal
and Co-Sale agreement will often be included which may include "tag-along" and/or "drag-along" rights. In the former,
the shares of a group of shareholders (often a venture capital
syndicate, together with some ancillary investors) are tied together such that if one shareholder has a buyer and wants to
sell his shares, he has to notify the others and they have the
right to buy his shares instead, or they can demand to "tagalong" and require that the outside buyer purchase all the
shares or none. 27 1 Obviously this can be a deal killer for the
outside buyer. Drag-along rights are sort of the mirror image
of tag-along rights. In this case, a shareholder of the syndicate
has found an interested buyer, but the buyer only wants to buy
all of the shares of the syndicate, or at least some number
greater than what the selling shareholder holds. If drag-along
rights apply, then the selling shareholder can require all of his
fellow syndicate investors, or enough to reach the number of
shares that the outside buyer requires, to sell some or all of
2 72
their shares.
The question then is how investors who hold restricted
stock, such as preferred stock purchased in a venture capital
private placement, cash out their position. The obvious path
would seem to be an IPO, yet, for existing shareholders, this is
not exactly the direct payoff that the lay person might expect especially if the investor did not get the right contractual provisions in place when she purchased the shares. As discussed
above, for private placement restricted stock to trade freely in
the secondary markets, it still needs to be part of a registered
offering. In other words, just because a company has had an
IPO does not mean that all of its shares are now freely tradable. Instead, the investor needs to make sure that her shares
will be either included in the IPO (unlikely as IPOs generally
can generally be made senior to other classes of series for things such as
distribution or liquidation payouts. Id.
271. See Miller et al., supra note 266, § 3:17.
272. See id.
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focus on primary market offerings, from the issuer to investors,
not secondary market transactions from investor to investor)
or a follow-on public offering or later registration. Further,
for maximum liquidity of the shares, the investor needs the
issuer to "list" or register the shares on a major market or exchange, such as NASDAQ or the NYSE, too. The bottom line
is that investors who bought pre-IPO or other unregistered
shares need to have a contractual registration right that allows
them to demand that the company register their shares upon
the occurrence of certain events. 273 Further, for preferred
shares that almost never get registered in a public offering probably because their special rights and preferences would
drag down the liquidity they would otherwise get in the public
secondary markets due to the literal information costs accompanying them - investors need to make sure that their shares
will either automatically convert or that they'll have the right
convert them to common shares in advance of, or upon, the
effective date of the IPO.2 7 4 Once the preferred shares have
been converted to common, then the investors can exercise
their registration rights, demand registration of their shares by
the issuer, and, once that is effected, finally begin selling them
in the public secondary markets.
The IPO and public trading of the investor's shares is not
the only avenue for the investor to cash out her position. In
some cases, SMEs will be acquired by a larger company. If the
investors are lucky, the acquiring company will be offering
cash to buy their shares to effectuate the acquisition. 2 75 In
other cases, the acquiring company will be offering its own
stock in exchange for the investor's stock in the target company, or perhaps a combination of cash and stock. In this scenario, the investor must decide whether the acquiring company's stock is worthwhile to hold for the long term as part of
273. See id.
274. See id. §§ 3:14, 3:17.
275. Note that since stock is generally considered to denote an equity or
ownership stake in the entity, the stockholders are collectively the only owners of the entity. Even founders of the company must hold stock to be considered owners. Thus, for one company to acquire another, it must acquire

ownership or title to the target company's outstanding stock. When it acquires all of that stock, the target becomes a wholly owned subsidiary; when
it obtains only a controlling part of the outstanding stock, the target becomes simply a subsidiary.
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a diversified investment portfolio, or whether it should be sold
for cash. If the acquiring company is itself privately held, then
the investor may be in no more liquid a position than when
she held the stock of the original target company. However,
provided that the acquiring company is publicly traded, and
offers publicly tradable registered shares in the merger, then
the investor can simply cash out by selling her newly acquired
stock in the secondary markets.
The foregoing scenarios all assume that the merger is effected by a stock purchase. Yet, the classic merger is a statutory merger in which the two companies actually become one
by an act of law. 2 76 In this case, depending on which company

is designated as the "surviving corporation," 277 the investor
may continue holding restricted stock in her original company.
The final major type of merger is not really a merger at
all, but an asset sale. This has benefits for the acquiring company in that it will not be taking on any outstanding or accrued liabilities or obligations of the target company. Instead,
it can simply buy the assets of the target, in some cases with
management and personnel intact. From the perspective of
an investor who wants to be cashed out, this might seem to be
the same as a stock or cash purchase merger, but the critical
distinction is that in the asset sale the target company receives
the stock or cash payment. Thus the investor still owns the
same stake in her original company as she started with. However, since the company may now hold nothing other than
cash and/or the "acquiring" company's stock, its shareholders
may be able to compel the board of directors to distribute this
cash or stock and dissolve the company.
Finally, even if neither an IPO nor a merger is in the
works, but the investor needs to cash out, she may still be able
to under either a private sale of her stock or exercise of a redemption right, if any. The safest way to structure a private
sale is by complying with the provisions of Rule 144278 or Rule
144A,2 79 promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Act of
1933. Under the former, the investor has to meet the require276. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 23B.11.010 (2007).
277. See id.

278. 17 C.F.R. §230.144 (2006).
279. 17 C.F.R. §230.144A (2006).
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ments of the rule to ensure that she is not considered an underwriter involved in a distribution of the stock, and thus the
transaction can be properly exempted under § 4(1).280 Under
the latter, the transaction is exempt from the registration requirements of § 5 so long as the investor is selling only to a
"qualified institutional buyer. ' 28 1 The main challenge with
both of these is not so much structuring the transaction correctly, but instead finding willing and appropriate buyers. The
markets for unregistered stock are thin and thus the stock is
nowhere near as liquid an investment as stock of a publicly
traded company, especially where one or more market makers
are ensuring a ready market for the latter. Finally, the investor
may also have a "redemption right," which requires the issuer
to buy back some or all of the investor's stock upon certain
triggers. 28 2 However, this right may simply refund the original
purchase price of the stock, or pay out some modest amount
over that price. It is not exactly the big return on investment
(ROI) that an investor is looking for; instead it is probably best
viewed as some downside protection similar to liquidation
preferences.
Now that we have established the basic parameters of the
types of stock held by SME high tech investors, I can outline
my proposal for how to use stock and options as a substitute
for running royalties. However, based on the foregoing, it is
important for potential licensors to understand just how liquid
(or illiquid) their investment is. This should certainly be a factor for any licensor who needs cash in hand sooner than some
eventual IPO or other exit event.
B.

Structuring Stock and Options as an Up-Front Royalty
Payment to Approximate Running Royalty Returns
Over Time

With all of this in mind, we can now turn to the breakdown of the different equity positions needed to turn my stock
and option payment plan into the rough functional equivalent
of a running royalty. First, the parties would negotiate the
deal as if it were a standard running royalty deal license and
settle on the amount of the upfront license fee payment and
280. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2000).
281. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A.

282. See Miller et al., supra note 266 § 3:16.
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the royalty rate. Second, the parties would negotiate whether
the upfront license fee payment is to be made in cash or stock.
This does not matter much for my purposes as the up-front
license fee payment is committed and paid upon execution of
the license, so for all intents and purposes no matter what happens later the licensor retains this payment. If pushed, I suppose I would suggest a cash upfront license fee payment since
the remainder of the compensation in the form of the running-royalty substitute will be in the form of stock or options
(which may turn out to be worthless if something happens to
the licensee). The real challenge then comes in structuring
the running-royalty substitute.
As an overview, the running-royalty substitute should provide a mechanism to coarsely track the successful commercialization of the licensed patent by the licensee. Accordingly, a
straight one-time grant of issued stock to the licensor might be
too disconnected from the success of the commercialization as
the licensee's stock may appreciate in value for wholly other
reasons than the successful commercialization of the licensed
patent. For example, the licensee may well have other proprietary technologies that it is developing, and it may be these
that lead to increased valuation of the licensee's stock at any
given -time. From the licensee's perspective, a one time grant
of issued stock is further problematic in that it will have immediate dilutive effect on the equity positions of other investors,
many of whom specifically negotiated for a specific percent
ownership stake in the company. This will be especially true
where the parties have agreed to a fairly high expected value
for the term of the licensed patent and thus a relatively large
number of shares would have to be issued and immediately
28 3
transferred to the licensor upon execution of the license.
283. Note that the per share price of the licensee's stock is itself an estimate, particularly where the company is still privately held. The parties
could look to the per share price of the last negotiated private placement of
the company's stock, but even this may not be an accurate measurement if
the shares placed in the private placement were preferred shares with specific (and valuable) rights and preferences that might differ from the rights
and preferences of the preferred shares to be issued to the licensor, and will
almost certainly differ from the standard rights assigned to common stock.
As a general matter, though, the price per share of the stock of early stage
tech SMEs is not going to be that high. Therefore, if the expected lifetime
value of the licensed patent is high, say $IM, then it will take quite a number
of shares to compensate the licensor adequately. For example, say that the
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The parties should use some combination of stock and
stock options instead, to more closely approximate the expected royalty payments in a traditional running royalty license. The parties must agree upon verifiable events that correspond to successful sales of licensed products to be used as
conditions precedent to the exercise of stock options granted1
at the time of execution of the license. 28 4 In the most direct
coupling, stock options could be set up that allow some number to vest, and thus become exercisable, per certain numbers
of licensed products sold. While options often have a "strike
price" - a fixed amount at which the option holder is entitled
to buy some number of shares of the option issuer regardless
of the fair market value of the shares at the time of option
exercise and purchase 28 5 - in my proposal the strike price
licensee's shares are estimated at $10 per share (not unusual in my experience), then the licensee would have to issue 100,000 shares to the licensor.
Of course, the licensee could argue that its share price is likely to increase
over the term of the patent (and license), and thus the licensor should accept fewer shares inversely proportional to this expected increase in the
price per share. Further, the licensee could argue that its position is no
more speculative than the calculation of the expected lifetime value of the
licensed patent. Nonetheless, even with some discounting of the number of
shares to be transferred as payment to the licensor, the total number will
likely still be sufficiently high to concern other investors, such as venture
capitalists, who are keenly aware of, and protective of, the relative percentage ownership stake of their holdings and any possibility of dilution.
284. Stock options are generally set up as legally binding contracts that
give the recipient a right to buy ("call option") or sell ("put option") a given
stock. Sometimes options conveyed directly from the issuer are called "warrants". See, e.g., LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS
§ 3.2.2(D) (4th ed. 2005).
285. This may be because many options are "purchased" for less than the
value of the underlying stock being optioned, thus the option holder has
agreed to pay some further consideration to actually buy the optioned stock.
This may be more readily accessible in the guise of, say, an option by a movie
producer for the rights to make the movie version of a popular book. The
producer is not ready to fully commit to pay the full agreed upon value of
the movie rights, but wants to essentially buy some time in which to decide
whether to commit. Absent an option, he could lose the rights to another
producer who is ready to contract to purchase the rights. The first producer, then, instead buys an option - in other words, he pays the book's
copyright owner a negotiated sum for the latter to "take the movie rights off
the market" for some period of time. At the end of the option period, the
producer needs to exercise the option and commit to buying the full movie
rights or lose his exclusive option. If he lets the option lapse, he may still, of
course, buy the movie rights at any later time, provided they are still availa-
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would likely be zero, or the option phrased so as to make clear
that the licensor as option holder essentially has a demand
right to receive x number of shares with no further payment.
If for some reason this "zero -strike price" or perhaps "fully
paid-up demand right" was deemed to be insufficient consideration for the ultimate conveyance of the actual issued shares,
then a nominal strike price could be added to the option
agreement. 286 However, in that case, the strike price would
have to be offset by additional option grants, or perhaps even
a proportionally greater up-front cash or stock payment.
The key difference between this option or warrant structure and running royalty license payments would be that the
options would vest under their own contractual terms - ideally
executed in a separate contract - which would not formally be
part of the license agreement (although probably referenced
therein) and hence not subject to cancellation or repudiation
based on patent challenges. The options themselves could be
styled as either an up-front royalty payment that would fully
satisfy the licensee's royalty obligations under the license
ble. Thus, the payment for the option and the payment for the movie rights
are two different negotiated deals, and no one would normally think that the
purchase of the option would be adequate consideration to actually also acquire the movie rights. In the securities context, options are often used to
lock in a certain price of otherwise fungible shares of the issuer. But a similar distinction exists between the payment required to secure this option,
and the final payment to buy the shares themselves. As a side note, the saying that options are "under water" is used to describe a situation where the
current fair market value of shares of the option issuer is less than the strike
price the options holder was granted in his options award/agreement.
Thus, the option is worthless to the holder at that point because she could
buy shares directly from the company or in the secondary markets, as applicable, for less than she would have to pay to buy them under her option
grant.
286. While I have yet to see an adequate explanation of the distinction
between stock "options" and "warrants," it could be that the warrant model is
more congenial to the zero strike price/fully paid-up demand right I envision. In my experience in private practice, "warrants" were used for investors who were purchasing shares but wanted a further option to buy more
shares at a future date, while "options" were used for employee (including
executive) and director inventive compensation packages. This sense of
"warrants" does seem to comport with one treatise writer's passing reference
to the same. See LARRY D. SODERQUIST, supra note 284. For a complementary definition of "warrants," see 17 C.F.R. § 240.12a-4 (2006) (exempting
certain warrants from Section 12(a)).
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agreement, or as another license fee.2 8 7 Given that there will

likely be a true up-front license fee paid in cash or issued stock
as described above, it may be confusing to label the "back end"
running royalty replacement options as another license fee.
Further, since the option payments considered here are truly
supposed to replace the running royalties, and given that royalties can indeed be paid up front or at any time in a lump
sum upon agreement of the parties, it is probably best to label
the option payments as a one time, fully compensating, royalty.
A possible problem with the straightforward coupling of
options vesting with actual sales of the licensed product is that
the licensee may simply not be very forthcoming with this information, particularly if it is contemplating challenging the
underlying patent. Of course, in most well-drafted running
royalty agreements there is a reporting requirement for the
licensee to give a relatively detailed account of how it arrived
at the amount of the royalty it is paying to the licensor for any
288
given royalty period as set out in the license agreement.
Yet, it is not hard to imagine that licensees may be tempted to
fudge these numbers a bit. Therefore, many running royalty
license agreements also include an audit provision that grants
the licensor the right to inspect the books and records of the
licensee at certain times to verify whether the reported royalties were correctly calculated. 28 9 However, these reporting obligations and audit rights may not be particularly effective
where the licensee is going to try to challenge the patent per
MedImmune. This is not to say that the provisions will be any
less binding, or that they will be disregarded, in a declaratory
judgment patent challenge action. Rather, the point is that if
the licensee is actively trying to blow up the underlying patent,
it may be in no mood to accurately calculate and pay royalties,
nor to allow in the licensor's accountants when the licensor
attempts to exercise its audit rights. Certainly these actions
might be deemed as license agreement breaches in their own
right - and thus perhaps allow the patent owner/licensor to
287. In the former, the license grant would read something like "licensor
hereby grants licensee a fully paid-up license...," while in the latter it would
be "licensor hereby grants licensee a royalty free, fully paid-up license.
See, e.g., NGUYEN ET AL, supra note 8, at 113-17.
288. See id. at 117-120.
289. Id.
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counterclaim on these grounds in the declaratory judgment
action - but the net result will still likely be the same. The
licensee may continue underreporting sales and blocking the
licensor's audit attempts during the pendency of the declaratory judgment action and thus the stock option royalty payment plan I am proposing might not be significantly more effective than a regular running royalty payment plan. 290 Note

that this story would change dramatically where the licensee is
a publicly traded or other reporting company that must fulfill
the mandatory disclosure requirements promulgated under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.291 In that case, potentially substantial penalties and liabilities could attach to the licensee for any material misreporting of its sales information in
the financial statements accompanying its annual or quarterly
292
reports.
To be on the safe side, licensors might instead tie the options vesting to different sorts of events, more easily verified
from a distance. Further, from my own experience, many tech
transfer licensing deals also contain some kind of extra compensation to the licensor when certain milestones are met by
the licensee, such as the successful filing of a New Drug Application (NDA) with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Sometimes the milestones instead work as a prod to the efforts
of the licensee in that a missed milestone may allow the licensor to terminate the license. Thus, in my proposal, licensors
could tie options vesting to any of these sorts of milestone
events, perhaps in addition to vesting directly coupled to sales
figures. In the most difficult to monitor situations, licensors
may instead simply establish a time based vesting schedule
(similar to how most employee stock options vest), which
could mimic the well-established use of "minimum royalties"
290. Balancing this somewhat is the marketing and promotion pressure
the licensee may feel to accurately report its sales publicly. However, such a
public pronouncement could be suitably rosy and vague such that the licensee may be able to have it both ways: underreporting sales to the licensor
and crowing about how good its business is going to the press. Further, it is
possible that other investors, such as venture capitalists, are receiving accurate numbers from the licensee and would be willing to share them with the
licensor. I am not overly optimistic about that possibility, though, and certainly I know of no general obligation on shareholders to share information
with other shareholders in privately held companies.
291. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m & 78o (2000).
292. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
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clauses in standard running royalty license agreements. 2 93 In
minimum royalties arrangements, the licensee must pay some
minimum amount each year, regardless of whether any products are sold under the license, just to retain the license grant.
This again underscores the notion that licensors are free to
request almost any sort of payment structure as "royalty" for
licensees use of the licensed patent. In fact, reviewing the
early licensee estoppel cases above, it is clear that the use of
sales based royalties developed somewhat later than the traditional use of fixed one time, annual or other periodic, royalty
structures. The challenge of minimum royalty provisions is especially acute for SME tech start-ups who are often cashstarved and "living" on their VC and other investors periodic
infusions of capital. For these companies, every extra fixed
cost that accrues in the pre-product or pre-revenue period increases the risk that the company will flame out before making
it to market with a product. This sort of scenario can lead to
license arrangements where there is little to no minimum royalties in the first few years of the license, but then the minimum royalties ratchet up over time, 29 4 in part to give strong
incentive to the company to not dally in its efforts to get a
product to market and begin generating revenues.
Accordingly, licensors under my proposal may seek to obtain a number of different stock option grants with different
vesting triggers or conditions. In the alternative, the options
could all be granted in one agreement, but with a complicated
set of vesting schedules and conditions. With luck, in the aggregate, the regular vesting of options on different schedules
and conditions over time, should roughly map the success of
the licensee in commercializing the patent. Further, it may
make sense for the licensor to secure some number of fully
issued shares in the early days of the license as a backstop
hedge against a licensee who winds up acting in very bad faith
and refuses to honor the licensor's attempt to exercise fully
29 5
vested options at some point in the future.

293. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 113-17.
294. Id.
295. Again, I think the risk of this is fairly low, in that it would be a financial suicide move for the licensee as soon as the story got out to other investors and the capital markets.
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So far, this all sounds promising. However, as discussed in
Part IV(A) above, investors who hold unregistered or restricted stock hold a fairly illiquid investment. Further, in the
case of tech SMEs, this investment is quite risky too, as many of
these ventures fail. Thus, the fear of getting locked into a
risky, failing investment should be a real one for patent owners
looking to implement my proposal. For some of these patent
owners, such as universities, this may not present as much of a
problem as it would for others, such as individual inventors, in
that the universities do not need or expect to make money off
every patent they license - indeed, some universities are not
even mandated to maximize returns on patents, but rather are
supposed to be engines of local economic development or assist the overall university mission of information dissemination. The individual investor, by contrast, may view his patent
as his sole chance to make a living off his inventions, and must
also diversify his investment portfolio, which will be harder to
do if the lion's share of his income is in the form of restricted
stock in a risky SME.
There is a further concern for my proposal, even for universities that can manage the risk of an illiquid investment in a
risky SME, which is that universities and other research organizations might not want to be in the business of holding an
increasing securities portfolio (outside of its regular endowment investments that is). There are a couple of disparate reasons for this. First, because the university will generally be
holding and licensing patents on inventions created by their
own faculty researchers, real or perceived conflicts of interest
can arise, especially where there is an ongoing relationship between the faculty researcher and the outside licensee. Similar
to the scandal that ensued at the University of Pennsylvania
when a clinical research subject, Jesse Gelsinger, died in the
middle of a gene therapy clinical trial for a outside biotech
company that the faculty researchers held stock in, university
holdings of stock in outside companies that are linked to the
university can raise serious ethical questions. 2 9 6 Second, because many universities share some portion of licensing reve-

296.

See

PATRICIA KUSZLER ET AL., GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW

381-416 (forthcoming 2007).
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nues with the faculty inventors, 297 the universities must take
care not to get caught under the securities law definition of
underwriters involved in a unregistered securities distribution
where they receive restricted securities from the licensee and
298 If
then convey some of the shares to the faculty inventors.
the licensee is already publicly traded and "pays" the royalties
with registered stock or options for the same, then this problem is greatly reduced. However, because many tech transfer
deals will involve privately held SMEs as licensees, then the securities used to "pay" the royalties will likely be restricted
stock. One avenue around this, similar to the liquidation discussion to be taken up below, is for universities to refrain from
conveying the restricted stock to the faculty inventors until
such time as it has been converted into common stock and
registered for trading in the public capital markets. Alternately, the university could find a way to cash out a portion of
its holdings in the licensee - through a resale of restricted securities under Rule 144 or Rule 144A as described in Part
IV(A) above - and then simply pay cash to the faculty investor.
The response to the foregoing concerns might not be for
universities and other research organizations to shy away from
my proposal, but rather to focus on ways to liquidate and diversify their holdings in SME restricted stock as soon as possible. As mentioned above, this will follow two major paths: i)
registration of restricted stock to trade in the public capital
markets as soon as possible after an IPO of the licensee; or ii)
resales of the restricted stock under Rule 144 or Rule 144A as
soon as practicable. This does not mean that the licensors
should divest themselves of all restricted shares received from
licensees, but rather only as much as needed to meet other
goals such as proper diversification of investments and to secure cash or publicly tradable securities to transfer to faculty
inventors for their portion of licensing revenues. In fact, it is
probably desirable for licensors to continue holding at least
some of the licensee's stock because, so long as the licensee
continues to seem promising, its stock may eventually provide
297. In fact, if federal funding was involved in the research that led to the
patent, then under Bayh-Dole, the university must share licensing revenues
from that patent with the inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
298. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a) (11) (2000) (defining "underwriter" under the
Securities Act of 1933).
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a tremendous return on investment as one of those "home
run" success stories that does happen here and there. To ef29 9
fect (i) above, the licensor must secure "registration rights"
in the stock or stock option conveyance agreements. These
rights will, at a minimum, give the licensor the right to demand that its shares are registered in some kind of follow-on
offering shortly after the IPO;300 at their maximum, these
rights can give the licensor the right to demand that the company take all steps possible to effect an IPO and register the
licensor's shares as part of that IPO or a quick follow-on offering.30 1 To effect (ii) above, the licensor needs to follow the
dictates of Rule 144 or Rule 144A, as applicable, which is a
discussion beyond the scope of this Article. The upshot
though is that for resales of restricted securities, the licensor
must avoid being deemed an "underwriter" by complying with
either: a) Rule 144's conditions such as a one year holding
period before resale, limitations on how much stock can be
sold, and limitations of sales to brokers' transactions or with a
market maker; 30 2 or b) Rule 144A's primary condition that the
resale be made only to a "qualified institutional buyer" as de30 3
fined therein.
In the end, while the processes may be tricky, and the
risks of perception issues such as conflicts of interest increased, my proposal will allow non-commercializing patent
owners such as universities to minimize the risk of royalty payment "defaults" by licensees who decide to challenge the underlying patent in the wake of MedImmune. At the same time,
if done creatively, stock and options up front royalty payments
will coarsely mimic the returns of running royalty license
agreements, "unlocking" equity value for the licensor at various steps along the way. This should effectively offset the po299. See Miller et al, supra note 266 § 3:17.
300. The licensor must also make sure that if it does not hold common
stock of the licensee, then it must hold convertible preferred stock that either converts into common automatically upon the IPO or is convertible
upon demand of the licensor. Licensors must watch the conversion formulas or rates used to convert preferred shares into common shares as the conversion will in many cases not be a simple one-for-one process.
301. See Miller et al., supra note 266 § 3:17.
302. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006).
303. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2006).
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tential damage to licensor-licensee relationships and prospective deals unleashed by MedImmune.
One might argue the equities from the licensee's perspective, though, and feel that my proposal somehow disadvantages the licensee. It is "paying" for a license that it may not be
using or that has been terminated or repudiated, or in which
the underlying patent has even been invalidated. The first answer is that this is how it has always been with licensing, despite
the Supreme Court's frequent misapprehension about it: a licensee is only buying a covenant not to sue from the licensor,
because it believes the licensor may be able to sue him now or
sometime in the future. There may come a time when it is no
longer true that the licensor can sue him - e.g., the underlying
patent is invalidated - but this only impacts an ongoing payment structure, not past payments already made. In other
words, as mentioned above, I have never heard of a court ordering repayment or refund of paid royalties of up front license fees or royalties just because a license was terminated or
a patent invalidated. Ultimately, the arrangement is equitable
because, as I discussed earlier, the licensee has often received
a substantial market benefit from the license even if the underlying patent is ultimately challenged. This is particularly true
in exclusive license situations. Thus, it would constitute an impermissible windfall for licensee to be able to require a refund
of licensee fees or royalties from licensor for the period before
the patent was challenged and during which licensee had all
the market benefits and pricing power of an exclusive right to
the patent.
Another factor that assists the licensee, under my proposal, is that the licensee is able to get a valuable license in exchange for what sometimes is thought of as the funny or free
money represented by stock. Stock grants are not actually a
free ride when thought of in terms of ownership stake and dilution of other ownership stakes. Plus as stock grants dilute
pre-existing ownership stakes they changes the control of the
company. Further, unless the licensor receives only some sort
of non-voting stock, then it will have all the voting rights of
other shareholders. But, outside of this, the use of stock eliminates the need for the company to part with cold hard cash
either upon execution of the license or in the future for royalty payments. In exchange the company's owners only lose
some control. The licensor needs to make sure that it will be
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able to liquidate all or some of the stock position as it needs to,
and this will require some better knowledge of securities laws.
Ultimately, my proposal has equities for both licensor and
licensee. While it may not perfectly mimic the projected (or
actual) returns of a running royalty license, it may still offer
some extra value for licensors and licensees generally. Finally,
to the extent it prevents a socially undesirable downward spiral
in deal licenses - especially those of universities and other non
profits as described above - then it will have served an enormous purpose.
V.
CONCLUSION

This Article has given a rough taxonomy of the many different kinds of licenses and motivations of the licensing parties. The taxonomy allowed us to review the extensive and
convoluted history of judicial doctrine with regard to licensing, in particular the doctrines of licensee estoppel, assignor
estoppel, and the application of the general doctrine of res
judicata to the world of settlement licenses. Following some
critically reviewed Supreme Court cases including Lear, the Article then analyzed the MedImmune decision and the current
controversy surrounding it, arguing that there are some serious flaws in the outcome. Nonetheless, because of the finality
of Supreme Court holdings, the Article moved on to propose a
system that is harmonious with MedImmune, and Lear for that
matter, yet allows licensors to put in place a functional
equivalent of the standard royalty payment models that is not
subject to the same payment risks as those royalty models are,
especially in the wake of MedImmune. In conclusion, I believe
that this Article provides a path to rebuild the solid, profitable,
and socially useful system of license relationships that has been
very nearly destroyed by MedImmune. Without it, we may well
see the decay of some of our most valuable science, medicine,
and technology R&D pathways that rely on technology transfer
from universities and non-profit research centers to the private
sector for commercialization.
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